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Efficient and Effective?
The Hundred Year Flood in the Communication and Perception of Flood Risk
Heather Bell
ABSTRACT

In response to the rising costs of floods, the United States has adopted
sophisticated programs to mitigate the loss of life and property. However, the
efficient implementation of certain aspects of flood policy has taken
precedence over effective communication. The scope of the National Flood
Insurance Program and the efficient coding of “the 100 year flood” have led to
a pervasive use of the term in both formal and informal risk communication.
When officials began consciously communicating flood policy to the public,
they assumed a narrow “engineering” model and did not fully anticipate the
influence of informal communication on the perception of flood risk. The
effectiveness of the “100 year flood” as a means to change attitudes or
motivate behaviors was not assessed. Nor was its utility in increasing public
understanding of flood risk.
New explanatory methods have been introduced, but they, too, have
yet to be tested. This project evaluated the effectiveness of four methods
commonly used to communicate the risk associated with policy’s benchmark
flood. These include: a 100 year flood; a flood with a 1 percent chance of

viii

occurring in any year; a flood with a 26 percent chance of occurring in 30
years; and a flood risk map available through Project Impact.
Data were collected using a structured face to face questionnaire
survey of residents living in Wimberley, Texas. Respondents included
individuals who lived inside the boundaries of official flood plains, as well as
those who did not. Comparable questions regarding uncertainty, perceived
need for protection, and levels of concern were asked using each of the four
methods of description. Qualitative observations were made during both the
interviews and the collection of secondary data.
Results showed a significant disjuncture of understanding and
persuasion with each method; potentially serious problems with the 26
percent chance method; and a preference for concrete references in
describing risk. It recommended that use of the 26 percent chance method be
discontinued. Both the 100 year flood and the map performed better than
expected; these descriptions are recommended with reservations in lieu of
more contextually appropriate methods of communication and policy
formation.

ix

Chapter One: Theoretical Context

Introduction

“Effective communication requires the sharing of either abstract codes or
contexts between sender and receiver” (Boisot, 1995, 93).

Information is required in order for individuals and societies to function;
communication is a means of exchanging information. In order to move
information from one conceptual or physical space to another, some form of
contact is required between the parties involved. Contact may take the form of
a verbal or visual code, a shared context, or both, but does not guarantee the
successful transmission of an intended message. When neither codes nor
contexts overlap, communication is both inefficient and ineffective.
The assumption of shared codes and context throughout social and
spatial categories can be problematic. Establishing actual shared codes and
contexts, or learning ways to communicate through the differences is difficult,
but necessary for meaningful communication. Without this effort, real debate
and understanding are impossible.

Any exchange becomes a frustrating

power play where all parties feel ill used as they talk (or yell) past one
another.

1

The problems of communication in general are amplified in risk
communication, where the stakes may be higher. A lack of shared context or
code can mean that both lives and substantial amounts of money are lost as
stakeholders run round different problems while assuming everybody is
addressing the same issue. When these assumptions are enshrined in risk
policy,

mistrust,

anger,

lawsuits,

death,

financial

loss,

panic,

or

overconfidence may result. In the formation and communication of risk policy,
effectiveness is often traded for efficiency, though communication will be
neither effective nor efficient if codification is not shared with those the policy
affects.
This problem is especially evident in the official approach to flood risk
communication. The “100-year flood” has become the cornerstone of
government flood policy and communication. The words are simple, but what
they codify is not. They are shorthand for a probability concept familiar to
scientists, but less familiar to lay folk. Explanations of the term often do not
clearly address the element of chance or uncertainty, though it is exactly
these elements of science that the 100-year flood represents. I believe the
ubiquitous use of the 100-year flood to be a privileging of efficiency over
effectiveness in both risk policy and risk communication. The prioritization of
efficiency may encourage misunderstanding and overconfidence and could
contribute to both death and financial loss. Might there a better way?
This project examines the public perception of the 100 year flood and
evaluates the effectiveness of this term and three other methods commonly
used to describe policy’s benchmark flood. These methods include “a flood
2

with a 1 percent chance of occurring in any year”, “a flood with a 26 percent
chance of occurring in 30 years”, and a flood risk map. The projec t also
attempts to identify alternative, and potentially more effective, methods of
communicating flood risk.
In order to make a meaningful assessment, it is necessary to look at
relevant concepts of communication. These include the ideas of codification
and context mentioned above, as well as those of efficiency and
effectiveness. These general concepts must in turn be related to risk
communication, risk perception, and uncertainty. Then we might be able to
understand, evaluate, and perhaps alter, the pervasive use of the 100-year
flood in regulation and communication.

Coding and Context

We are constantly bombarded by information. Our brains cannot
handle the infinite individual data coming through our ears, tongue, eyes,
nose, and skin simultaneously. Our processor is not fast enough. Coding is a
coping mechanism that prevents information overload by categorizing
incoming data. It is an organizational method that allows us to pick out
relevant information, lump it together, and put it into boxes which take up less
cognitive space and time. Instead of recognizing and processing each
component of a specific road individually, the combined perception of black,
yellow, and white, patterned by cracks and the smell of tar is collapsed into a
single package named “4th Street” and stored away. Coding “economizes on
3

the quantity of data to be processed” (Boisot, 1995, 57). The goal of coding is
efficiency of both thought and communication. Abstraction performs a similar
economizing role through the further lumping of conceptual categories.
While coding is an individual coping mechanism, social codification is
also possible. Language is a form of social codification, but it is not the only
form of codification used to communicate. Body language, facial expressions,
gestures, color, and form are all used to communicate in social contexts.
Contexts differ, however, and codification may change with them. A light
touch on the arm means very different things in different situations.
Apparent similarity in social codification (i.e. language) may lead to
severe misunderstandings if differences in contexts are not recognized.
Context refers to general physical, political, economic, social, and cultural
structures, as well as individual and familial situatedness within those
structures over time and space. What is actually packed into the efficient,
economizing package of phrase or gesture depends on the contextual history
of the individuals and groups using it, as well as the situation at hand. One
who does not share a context with another, or does not recognize a valid
difference in contexts, does not have immediate access to the same package.
The content is different, though the wrapping looks the same. Can the word
“money” possibly mean the same thing to one who’s never had it and one
who’s never been without? Codification always occurs within a context. We
can learn the surficial code; it is harder to get at the underlying context.

4

Because codification occurs in context and economizes data, existing
methods of categorization tend to be reinforced, and new information may be
overlooked. Creating new categories takes time and energy. Efficient coding
“tends to give an existing repertoire of complexions a life of its
own. With repeated use, it acquires inertia and becomes in
consequence hard to modify or replace. New stimuli are then
filtered through an already established perceptual structure
according to assignment rules set by existing codes. Where
stimuli herald the emergence of new and complex phenomena,
calling perhaps for a fresh coding effort, they may not even be
detected … , let alone responded to” (Boisot, 1995, 47).
In practice, this tendency makes codification potentially dangerous, though
necessary. It is more efficient to ignore or transform other perspectives than to
create new categories for conflicting information. Ignorance becomes a coping
mechanism. It is unintentional; we do not even realize we might be missing
something. Contexts are validated through codification, as are codification’s
specific packages. Shared contexts are less likely as time and distance
increase. Differing contexts become harder to recognize and understand and
shared social codifications are less likely to have the same content.

Efficiency and Effectiveness

“The first is concerned with economizing on means, the second with achieving
ends” (Boisot, 1995, 118)

“In a communication model, the function of coding is to communicate
effectively and efficiently” (Boisot, 1995, 42). What does it mean to
communicate efficiently and effectively? Is it possible to do both? Boisot
5

implies that it may be a difficult balancing act that involves trade-offs in
modern communicative situations.
Shannon and Weaver (1949) identify three types of communication
problems: technical; semantic; and pragmatic. Efficient communication deals,
in part, with the first problem. How do you get the most transmission bang for
your communicative buck? Efficient communication requires the quick,
accurate transmission of a message with as little cost as possible. The idea is
to pack as much you can into a bundle that does not weigh down the system
or lose its parts on the way from source to receiver.
How do you do that? First, just as if you were mailing a package, you
make it small, light, compact, and durable, easily bounced from place to
place. You eliminate what data appear to be extraneous, lump the rest
together, and tie them up with a single word, phrase, or gesture. You code
them. Second, you make sure your methods of transmission do not rip, tear,
snip, add to, significantly slow, or divert the package you sent. Increased
efficiency and higher levels of codification become more important as distance
and the number of receivers and transmitters increases.
Does the fact that your package gets to your intended receiver
apparently unmolested mean that the communication is effective? No!
Shannon

and

Weaver

(1949)

and

Boisot

(1995)

closely

relate

communication’s effectiveness to its success in influencing behavior in a
manner desired by the sender. “A meaningful message in some way changes
an

individual’s

disposition

to

act”

(Boisot,

1995,

107).

Effective

communication overcomes Shannon and Weaver’s pragmatic problem. All
6

effective

communication

is

persuasive.

The

conceptualization

of

communication as purely persuasive is called a “dominance model” (McQuail
and Windhal, 1981).
Efficiency has little to do with the receiver. It does not require either a
shared code or a shared context. Effectiveness, on the other hand, is
dependent, to some extent, on both. If the receiver has never seen the
gesture or heard a word before, no persuasion will be possible. The
communication will have neither relevance nor use to the receiver. There will
be no category in which the information fits and it is unlikely that the incoming
data will be coded by the receiver. The message may very well be ignored
completely, and will obviously be ineffective.
A common code, such as shared language, is the first step in
overcoming both semantic and pragmatic problems. The message will at
least be recognizable and potentially relevant to the receiver. Boisot (1995)
argues that selecting a suitable code addresses

most of the semantic

problems of communication. I would argue that a code’s suitability depends in
large part on context.
A common code does nothing to guarantee a change in the likelihood
of behavior. As noted previously, meaning changes with context. A sender
can control the code used to package information, and to some extent the
method of transmission. A sender has little to no control (other than the
selection of an audience) over the coding processes of the receiver. The
message may take on a life of its own in other contexts. The message might
surficially mean the same thing, but not have the same contextual meaning.
7

The more highly coded and efficient a message is, the more data it loses and
lumps, and the more easily a receiver attaches his or her own associations.
The source of information, particular words, or potential inferences may
have symbolic meaning to a receiver unrecognized by the sender. Hovland
(1948) has shown that symbols play key roles in a receiver’s coding process.
In a shared context, symbols and values are more likely to be similar and
communication has a better chance of being effective. Behaviors are more
predictable. Without immediate access to a shared context, effective
communication takes much more effort. A shared context must instead be
created physically, mentally, or affectively.
There are many who contest the equation of a communication act’s
effectiveness with its persuasiveness (F. Johnson, 1991; Ruckelshaus, 1983;
Belsten, 1996; Trumbo, 2000; Parker, 2000; Kasemir, 2003). This sort of
theory establishes a paradigm of manipulation, where the goal is invariably
power over another. It encourages the view of communication as strictly one
way and regulatory. By equating meaning with persuasion, communication
possibilities are limited and understanding is undervalued. Persuasion
continues, however, to be the practical, if not theoretical, model of much risk
communication. Flood risk communication, in particular, follows the
persuasive model.

8

Risk Communication

Components and Interpretations
“Just as they must understand the strengths and limitations of risk
assessment, communicators must appreciate the wisdom and folly in public
attitudes and perceptions” (Slovic, 1986, 184)
By Boisot’s definition (1995) of effective communication, most risk
communication has failed miserably. People often simply do not do what risk
communicators and other auth orities want them to. People do not wear their
seat belts, do not take precautions against natural hazards, do not test for
radon, and they continue to smoke. All of these behaviors are statistically
risky and claim numerous lives and millions of dollars every year. Each risk is
fairly easily mitigated. Quit smoking and wear your seat belt and you will
(probably) live longer. Many of us do neither of these things, but we worry
obsessively about nuclear power and plane crashes (Slovic, 1987).
Statistically these risks claim fewer lives and cost less money. What’s the big
deal? Why don’t people worry about what they ‘should’? Why don’t we do
what is ‘good’ for us?!
Finding the answers to these questions involves untangling the threads
of risk perception and risk communication. This is a difficult task, as they are
two intimately related parts of an evolving whole. Their relationship is neither
linear nor inclusive, but mutually affective. It is not possible to address one
without also looking at the implicatio ns for the other. Let us begin with risk
communication.

9

Risk communication as a field of study is relatively new. This is not to
say that no one conveyed risk information prior to the 1980’s, but that
academic interest in the communication of risk increased at this time. Trumbo
(2000) identifies two meanings of “risk communication”. Risk communication
can refer to a subject of study looking at the situational factors surrounding
the creation of, the transmission of, and the response to risk information. It
can also be “an instrument used by parties with vested interests to control
information”

(Trumbo,

2000,

192).

The

second

meaning

includes

communication from those protecting the public’s well being as well as those
trying to convince us that they are not harming anyone. This type of risk
communication is nothing new, and is essentially persuasive. Risk
communication as a subject of study gained recognition (and funding) in the
late 70’s and early 80’s. Since then, a more formal theoretical base has been
established. Communication theory was appropriated by those working in risk
and vice versa, resulting in a discipline capable of asking unique questions
and generating practical responses to pressing real world problems.
From an official’s point of view, the problem was “Why doesn’t the
public do the right thing, even when we give them the necessary information?
Why don’t they listen to us? What do they think we are, miracle workers? How
ignorant!.” From the public’s perspective, it was “Why don’t the officials tell us
what we want to know? And why don’t they listen to us? What do they think
we are, idiots? How arrogant!.” Those contributing to risk communication
research hoped to reduce losses and conflict by bringing these two groups
closer together. The a pproaches to doing so changed through time.
10

Powell and Leiss (1997) identify three phases in the development of
risk communication. [Gilbert White and those working in the Chicago school
during the mid 20 th century may take offense to the dates assigned to these
phases, as their work in risk perception made the “second stage” of risk
communication possible (White, 1945, 1964; Murphy, 1958; Kates and White,
1961).] The first phase, which they date from approximately 1975-1984,
focused on comparable risk assessment. Emphasis was put on technical
expertise and the identification of physical risk categories. It was believed that
all people should view “managing opportunities and dangers on the basis of
comparative risk information” as an “inescapable duty” (Powell and Leiss,
1997, 36).

Communication was authoritarian, privileging scientists and

officials and denigrating a public who thought and talked about risk differently.
Neither code nor context was considered and communicators and scientists
were assumed to be altruistic and objective (Kasperson and Stallen, 1991).
During the second phase (1985-1994), risk communicators recognized
they had an audience and borrowed from marketing. Communicators and
officials began feeling out their audiences and attempted to tailor their
messages. The key to effective communication became persuasiveness.
Communication was instrumental and one sided, but made an effort to
recognize public wants and needs. Altruism continued to be assumed, though
total objectivity was questioned. Communicators sought to use shared codes
and began to consider the importance of context. Unfortunately, it has been
determined that trust in the communicator and message source is imperative
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for risk communication to be persuasive (Covello et al., 1987; B. Johnson,
1987; Slovic, 1993). Trust was in short supply.
The current phase encourages the building of public trust in
governmental organizations and experts. Communication emphasizes social
context and attempts to initiate a stakeholder dialogue rather than an official
monologue. This phase also focuses on demonstrating an official commitment
to good risk communication practices. This is accomplished through
consistent trustworthy action in and out of crisis situations. Issues of both
coding and context have been brought to the fore in this third stage. There
has been a move towards understanding and consensus in risk assessment
and

communication.

Effectiveness

has

begun

to

part

ways

with

persuasiveness, though the extent to which this is practical or possible is
debatable.
Covello

et

al.

(1986)

identify

four

components

of

the

risk

communication process. These include the message source, message
design, delivery channel, and target audience. This model closely follows the
normative model of general communication. Communication can be either
one-way or two-way; Covello et al. (1987) argue that “effective risk
communication must be understood as a two-way interactive process that is
based on mutual respect and trust”(1987, 9). In theory, either side can be the
message source, but their focus is on the source as the scientist or
government. Risk communication is primarily seen as transmitting technical or
scientific information regarding risk from the experts to the public. Their linear
model is described by Kasperson and Stallen (1991) as “the engineering
12

approach.” The exchange of non-scientific types of risk information is not
addressed. Their model represents the second phase in the development of
risk communication.
Krimsky and Plough (1988) identify five slightly different components of
risk communication: intention of the communicator; content of the message;
nature of the audience; source of the message; and direction of the message.
In addition to these components, they add a latitude factor. Each component
may be interpreted broadly or narrowly. Covello et al.’s (1987) “engineering”
model is linear and narrow. Communication assumes intentionality and a goal,
targets an audience, has an expert point source, and flows along designated
channels. The broad interpretation takes into account the potential for
communicative free-for-alls.
A broad interpretation does not assume a goal and models
communication as coming from any source through any channel to any
audience. Non-scientific Information may still influence risk perception. A
broad interpretation better anticipates the unintended consequences of risk
information taking multiple paths through multiple sources to recipients
outside a target audience. Each new source and path changes, and
potentially removes, the intention of communication. A carefully prepared
code may initiate different symbol relations and take on different meanings in
unforeseen contexts.
A broad view assumes less control over the result of communication
and acknowledges multiple sources and types of risk information. It is
essentially contextual. It expands on the narrow model, but does not render it
13

useless. Much research continues to be conducted using the narrow model.
Looking beyond the narrow results may give us a more accurate picture of
risk communication as a whole, however. We may be able to better recognize
uncertainties, not only in the message, but in its path, interpretation, and the
response it engenders.

Process and Problems
The process of risk communication might become clearer through
illustration. Physician-patient communication has long been used as a model
for risk communication (Tonn et al.,1989). Like all risk communication, it
incorporates elements of uncertainty and probability not often found in general
communication. I will address each component of the risk communication
process outlined above. The object is not only to explain the components
themselves, but to identify the potential failure of communication at each
stage. I will first examine the narrow model and then move to a broader
perspective.
Tonn et al. (1989) describe the basic risk communication process as
being comprised of four steps. This is a linear model assuming one source,
one message,

and an intended receiver or set of receivers. First, “the

physician develops an internal cognitive judgment of the patient’s state-ofbeing” (Tonn et al.,1989, 215) . This is the risk assessment. A physician’s
judgment is the result of his or her quantitative physical analysis combined
with a contextual perception of risk. Risk perception will be covered in more
detail in the following section. The physician is the source of the message as
14

well as its communicator and has a stake in the message and the patient’s
response in both roles.
In the second step, the physician “translates the internalized feeling
into a message that can be communicated to the patient” (215). This is the
initial coding process. Relevant components include Krimsky and Plough’s
(1988) intentionality as well as the content of the message. What is the
physician’s objective? Is it patient understanding or a particular patient
response? What response? Is efficiency or effectiveness emphasized through
the coding process? What did the physician choose to include or leave out? It
may be that the message intentionally does not reflect the physician’s own
assessment and perception.
In the third step, the patient “accepts the message and translates it into
a form amenable for cognitive processing” (Tonn et al., 1989, 215). This is
the second coding, where the patient categorizes the incoming data (the
physician’s message) into his or her own space saving packages. Prior to this
second coding, the physician decided on a delivery channel and delivery
direction. This might be a direct one-on -one spoken exchange, or could take
written form or that of another medium. Communication might also be directed
towards a group. It is at this stage that the audience plays an active role in
communication.
Fourth, the patient “internalizes the message into a cognitive form
consistent with his or her knowledge about uncertainty and medical contexts”
(Tonn et al., 1989, 215). The cognitive form the message takes, and hence
its meaning, very much depends on the patient’s experience with uncertainty
15

and his or her condition, as well as the patient’s knowledge, attitude, and
situation. Meaning depends on perception, which is contextual. Context and
cognition determine the “nature” of the audience.
Whether effectiveness is gauged by the level of understanding or the
adoption of a specific attitude or behavior, communication must take into
consideration both coding and context in every step of the process. In this
narrow, linear example, it is the physician who judges the success or failure of
the communication. A communication is successful if he or she is satisfied
with the outcome. A successful risk communication is one in which the
audience’s perception of risk and uncertainty is functionally similar to that of
the source. Regulatory risk communication is often judged the same way.
Where might things go wrong? First, let’s focus on the source, which in
this case is also the communicator. Is the physician able to code the
information and uncertainty he or she wishes to communicate? It may be that
the physician has no existing boxes in which to categorize data. How does
one then send the package on? What has his or her own contextuality filtered
out? What if the incoming data produce conflicting symbols and images within
the physician? These types of problems make putting together a message
very difficult and prevent communication from being efficient or accurate.
A second problem, one that research has deemed to be of primary
importance to risk management, is the issue of trust (Covello et al., 1987; B.
Johnson, 1987; Slovic, 1993). No matter how efficiently coded a message is,
no matter how much source and audience coding overlap, no matter how
contextually tailored a message is to an audience, the communication will not
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be effective if the source is not trusted. Ne ither audience perception nor action
will come closer to that held or desired by the source. Conflict continues,
though risk communication is intended to decrease it. Slovic (1993) has
argued that “trust is more fundamental to conflict resolution than risk
communication”, although good communication can prevent increased
conflict. Once broken, trust is very difficult to regain (Slovic, 1993; Covello et
al., 1987). Trust is particularly problematic in the area of technical risk
communication and management, but can also come into play in the natural
hazards arena. The discrepancy can be explained through the research on
risk perception covered below. The level of trust results from the perception of
not only the source, but the risk itself.
The next set of problems arise when the message channel is added to
the mix. The more physically and temporally removed an audience is from the
communication source, the fewer types of codes are available for use (Boisot,
1995). In a one-on-one situation, gestures, expressions, voice inflection, as
well as language provide information. In a physician’s pamphlet (or in a flood
risk map), not only are data very efficiently packaged, only one type of
package is available. The message channel must be appropriate to the
message in order for communication to be potentially effective.
A third set of problems involves the combination of audience, message,
and source. It may be the physician has used words unknown to the patient.
The source is not using a code shared by the target audience. This is, in part,
a result of different contexts. It is possible that the physician uses familiar
words to convey information for which the patient has no categories. This
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makes a second coding difficult. It may be that the physician uses analogies
that inappropriately substitute familiar concepts for unfamiliar concepts of risk
and uncertainty. Research has shown the use of analogy in risk
communication to be problematic (Slovic, 1986).
Communication may also break down if the words used by the source
are familiar, but mean different things to the receiver. How probable is
“possible”? Is a 50 percent chance high risk or low risk? Given the same odds
of being overrun by locusts, one person may decide to get out of Dodge, while
another chuckles and goes to fetch the bug spray. Symbols associated with
the message may also differ, shading its meaning. Hazard imaging has been
shown to play a role in coding (Slovic, 1986, Benthin et al., 1995) and may
vary between individuals and groups. The above problems are issues of
shared context and perception. A source must actively seek to create a
shared context to increase the chances of effective communication (in
addition to increasing trust levels), whether effectiveness is judged by
persuasion or understanding.
What happens when a broad interpretation of risk communication
processes is adopted? What might change? How would effectiveness be
evaluated? Potential problems increase with the number of sources, channels
and audiences. Messages coded for a specific context may find themselves in
unfamiliar terrain after a quick game of telephone. It has been noted that
messages for a general audience also hit the contextual subgroups
(Callaghan, 1987). But it is also the case that messages bound for specific
subgroups may be intercepted, in whole or in part, by unintended receivers. It
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is conceivable, even probable in the case of the 100 year flood, that what is
believed to be a message coded for a general audience is, practically
speaking, targeted toward a subgroup.
Not all risk communication is official, and not all communication about
risk is scientific. Friends and neighbors chat, people watch movies, and many
of us eavesdrop. Risk information may be passed along all these channels,
both intentionally and unintentionally. As a message weaves its way through
different contexts, symbols and meanings change. An efficient package may
easily be separated from its meaning in an intended context by time, space,
and perception. In a broad model, contextual contact points and message
paths might be as important as the “nature” of the intended audience.
Efficiency might be more of a liability in a broad model if a coded message is
shown to be easily adapted to a variety of specific symbol sets and meanings.
These differenc es may in fact be reinforced through the repeated use of the
efficient code. Chaos may reign in the guise of order. The subject has yet to
be studied thoroughly.
Mileti et al. (1989) have identified a sequential process and problem set
similar to that of the physician-patient example. The “hear-perceive-respond”
model is also narrow, but examines communication and response from the
receiver’s perspective. The coding and contextual components discussed
above are examined in terms of understanding, belief, and personalization. All
are directly related to perception. In Mileti et al.’s model, risk communication
processes can be understood only in light of risk perception. Lave and Lave’s
(1991) communication analysis is also focused on the receiver. They sought
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to improve narrow risk communication by creating perceptual models of risk
for both experts and laymen and rectifying gaps using appropriate and
relevant codes.

Risk Perception

Situational and Cognitive Factors
Tobin and Montz (1997) identify two categories of components that
influence perception: situational factors and cognitive factors. Perception in
turn affects response. If judging a communication’s effectiveness by its
demonstrated persuasiveness (i.e. behavior), then these factors must be
taken into account. Together, they constitute the context and potential coding
of communication. White began the work of recognizing perceptual variables
and applying them to response (White, 1945). The components of perception
are interactive, but communication has tended to focus on the situational
factors as a guide to message construction, presumably because cognitive
factors are more difficult to assess and group.
Situational factors include variables of the physical and socio-economic
environments. Physical components include the magnitude, frequency, and
duration of individual hazard types. Their technical assessment and
comparison was the focus of the first stage of risk communication. It has since
been shown that the physical event is not a good predicto r of response (Tobin
and Montz, 1997), though experience influences perception negatively and
positively. Experience tends to bound one’s knowledge of the event,
20

influencing its imaginability, and thus its categorization and assessment
(Slovic et al., 1974).
Using

the socio-economic environment to predict perception and

response has also been shown to be problematic. Individuals and
communities with similar social relations may react differently to “identical”
hazards (Clifford, 1956). Socio-economic variables include individual traits,
such as age, gender, health, and race. Group and community characteristics
like family ties, social support systems and demographic make -up also
influence perception, response, and communication. The communication
channels available and the potential message paths depend on these
characteristics, and in turn, become part of the context. Cultural variables like
language,

religion,

and

behavioral

norms

may

also

influence

the

categorization of incoming information by providing an existing coding system
and symbol set.
Situational factors alone do not determine response. The individual
cannot be ignored, though in cases of extreme marginalization or vulnerability,
situational factors may significantly bind cognitive ones.

Cognitive factors

work alongside situational factors to influence perception and behavior, but
the relationship is not fully understood. Tobin and Montz (1997) include
psychological and attitudinal variables in the cognitive category. An
individual’s coding processes and symbologies, locus of control, methods for
coping with uncertainty (these are covered in greater detail below), and
general outlook all fit under the heading of “cognitive factors”. None exist
outside of situational factors, however. Situational factors will determine
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whether or not risk communication is relevant (Slovic, 1986). Cognitive factors
will help determine a person’s communicative capabilities and needs, as well
as control shortcuts to processing information.

Perceptual Trends
While it is difficult to generalize about the specific play of situational
and cognitive factors in perception, some general trends have been identified.
(Finucane et al., 2000; Daggett, 1987; Slovic et al., 1980, 1979, 1976; Slovic
et al., 1974). These trends apply to non-scientists in particular, but expert
judgment may also be fallible. Trends include the use of heuristics, the
inclusion of qualitative factors in assessment, and an aversion to uncertainty.
Heuristics are mental short-cuts. Like coding, they make mental tasks
like processing information more manageable. Also like coding, they can
become entrenched and lead to other sorts of difficulties. Two types of
heuristics pertinent to risk perception have been identified: availability and
affect. Availability has to do with the ease with which something is recalled.
Availability was touched on above in terms of imaginability. The more easily a
hazard is imagined, the more frequent it is assumed to be (Slovic et al., 1976).
Ease of recall is not always an effective measure of frequency or risk.
Situational and cognitive factors will influence perception. A recent event,
though rare, might be more easily recalled than a more common event more
temporally distant. Imaginability is also affected by more than the physical
characteristics of the hazard. Risk communication in both the broad and
narrow senses will have a significant bearing on availability. (Slovic, 1976,
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1986; Kasperson et al., 1988) Targeted information campaigns or media
attention may increase the visibility, and thus the perceived frequency, of
hazards. Non-targeted, informal risk information will also increase the
perception of frequency. I’ve never come across an aggressive shark, but I’m
certainly less likely to go into the water after watching “Jaws”.
The affect heuristic describes the knee-jerk like-it-or-don’t-like -it
reaction to information. Images are also pertinent here, as the “Jaws” example
illustrates. Epstein (1994) explains that all of us (even the experts)
“apprehend reality in two fundamentally different ways.” One is based on
reason, the other is not. The relevance to risk perception is that as perceived
benefit (“I like it!”) increases, the perceived risk decreases. Similarly, as dread
increases (“I hate it!”), perceived risk in creases. Levels of dread may be
based on knowledge of potential consequences, the perceived ability to
control the hazard, and the perceived impact on future generations. In
general, the more familiar a hazard, the less it is dreaded (Daggett, 1987;
Slovic , 1987). Most natural hazards are not dread, while nuclear energy, in
any form, is (Slovic , 1987). These biases solidify over time and are difficult to
change. They filter subsequent information (Slovic et al., 1979; Slovic et al.,
1974).
“Experts” tend to equate risk with fatalities. In addition to dread and the
level to which the consequences are known, lay people also often include
catastrophic potential and the effect on future generations (Slovic et al.,
1980). These are rational assessments. Risk com munication that dismisses

23

any of these factors will be deemed irrelevant and condescending. It will be
ineffective.

Uncertainty
“We have considerable social science and psychological theory and some
evidence that resource users are unwilling or unable to adopt this probabilistic
view of the world and are not able to live with uncertainty ” (Burton and Kates,
1964, 433)
Perhaps the most problematic trend in risk perception is the public’s
utter distaste for uncertainty. Science is uncertain. Risk assessment is
probabilistic. Official risk communication is probabilistic. But people do not like
probabilities; they like facts (Slovic, 1986). Tobin and Montz (1997) identify
three models used for coping with uncertainty.
The first two are based in the tradition of “cognitive dissonance” first
examined by Festinger in 1947. They are labeled determinate perception and
dissonant perception.

In the determinate model, people eliminate the

randomness of an event. Hazards become both knowable and controllable.
Randomness can be eliminated in two ways. First, a pattern can be mentally
projected onto a hazard. “Oh, sure, we get a storm like this every six years.”
Another way to pattern hazards is through the “Gambler’s Fallacy”, what
Slovic calls the “law of averages”. “If it happened this year, it can’t happen
next year.” The second method is the technological fix. “We’ve got a levee –
no more flooding.” Technological fixes can promote a false sense of security
that may increase the potential damage should the “fix” fail, a phenomenon
known as “the levee effect” (Tobin, 1995).
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These myths may become

ingrained in the local context through informal (broad) risk communication and
influence the categorization (or dismissal) of subsequent risk information.
The second model is that of dissonant perception. This is the model of
denial. Denial may be complete, “We don’t have hurricanes in Texas. They
only hit Florida”, or partial. Partial denial involves placing the threat in the past
or giving it only minor importance. An event might be perceived as a freak
occurrence, the result of conditions unlikely to occur again (Slovic, 1987).
Minor importance might refer to the perceived magnitude of the event, or to
perceived personal impact. “What, me worry?” Dissonant perception poses
the same problems as determinate perception to effective risk communication.
The third model is probabilistic. This method accepts the randomness
of events, but renounces all action. It takes the determinate method to the
other

extreme.

The

hazard

becomes

completely

unknowable

and

uncontrollable; taking responsibility for one’s fate is no longer necessary or
possible. “It’s in God’s hands.” Instead of eliminating uncertainty, this method
eliminates the need to wrestle with it. Those utilizing the probabilis tic method
are unlikely to be capable of coding risk information without significant effort.
Persuasion assumes some culpability. Communication is unlikely to be
effective, though not all people adopting probabilistic models forgo action.
Kasperson and Stallen (1991) argue that the problem with the
normative “engineering” model of risk communication is that “it is heavily
oriented towards the product (the understanding of the message) as opposed
to an emphasis on the process developing an enduring capability in those
potentially at risk which can handle uncertainty” (Kasperson and Stallen,
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1991, 4). Uncertainty is not going away, but little research has been done on
ways to increase the public’s acceptance of uncertainty, rather than the
public’s understanding of its “proper” quantification. The bigger challenge is
perhaps getting the public to understand that those quantifications are
uncertain and changing as well, made certain only by social “necessity”.
The science upon which we base our policies is full of uncertainty.
Knowledge is always produced in context, and always based on the study of a
sample. The context may lead to a specific categorization of observation and
the sample may be very small. When science is used as the basis of
regulatory policy, its inherent uncertainties do not often show. Once
extrapolated and canonized, errors and uncertainties compound, but are
hidden. Schon (1982) and Brian Wynne (1992) argue that “the policy
language of risk…falsely reduces uncertainties to the more comforting illusion
of controllable probabilistic processes” (Wynne, 1992, 150). This patterning of
risk uncertainty into probability allows risk policy to be made, but uncertainties
may be further patterned when policy is communicated to the public.
Policy language is created by politicians, not scientists, and for specific
purposes. The goal of policy communication is not simply public
understanding, but public compliance. Policy communication is one-way and
its effectiveness is measured through persuasion, not understanding. During
policy formation, communication may be (should be, if trust, shared context, a
shared code, and effective policy are important) dialogic and oriented towards
understanding. Once policy is set, communication changes. If a shared code
and context has not been built prior to the setting of policy, as is the case with
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flood policy, communicators can only attempt to tailor the message and
method to the targeted audience. If the audience perception has been
misjudged or overlooked, effective communication will be impossible. An
overly efficient message may also make effective communication difficult.
Wynne argues that, in some sense,
“scientific uncertainty can be seen to be important, not in itself,
supposedly measurable on some objective scale, but as a
function of (in relation to) the extent of technological or policy
commitment riding on the body of knowledge concerned. As
such commitments grow, we can tolerate less uncertainty”
(Wynne, 1992).
The wider the variety of situations to whic h uncertain knowledge is applied,
the greater the uncertainty and error it produces. But the bigger a policy’s
scope, the more important it is to produce absolute benchmarks. The more
visible and politically powerful a policy becomes, the more important th at it
appear free of uncertainty. Politicians, like the public, like “facts”. Error and
uncertainty are enshrined in a language of absolutes or unchanging
probabilities.
The bigger a policy’s scope, the further its message must travel.
Uncertainty makes a message bulky and inefficient. There are too many buts
and addendums tagging along for an uncertain message to travel very far. In
order to be efficient, the message needs to drop some baggage. The more
certain a message appears, the more efficient it becomes. Thus, as a policy’s
reach extends, two factors work towards the elimination of uncertainty in risk
policy communication: a general aversion to uncertainty and the need for
policy’s efficient transmission. Uncertainty lets go of its qualifications, and in
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its “certain” efficiency, it is replicated and ingrained through heuristics and
coding mechanisms.

The 100 Year Flood

Historical Management Parameters
The use of the 100 year flood as the focal point of current U.S. flood
policy illustrates the difficult marriage of uncertainty and policy described
above. It is also a good example of many of the communication challenges
already discussed. Before examining the problems embedded in 100 year
flood terminology, it is necessary to look at how it came to occupy its current
position.
In 1875, a congressional report lamented the lack of a unified flood
control program, stating that “ the experience of one hundred and fifty years
has utterly failed to create judicious laws or effective organization in the
several states themselves, and no systematic cooperation has ever been
attempted between them. The latter is no less important than the former, for
the river has no respect for State boundaries” (House Doc. No.127, in
PWRPC, 1950). This was an early call for streamlining flood management.
Prior federal involvement, like the Swamp Land Acts of 1849 and1850, the
Flood Control Act of 1917, and the 1927 Rivers and Harbors Act, focused on
specific projects or prioritized navigation. Most flood control, however, was left
in the hands of individual communities and states.
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In spite of the 1875 plea, federal involvement remained spotty, though
funding and research increased. It was not until the 1936 Flood Control Act
that flood control became the official responsibility of the federal government.
The Act, like others preceding and following it, was passed in order to reduce
losses caused by flooding. Delegating responsibility for flood control to a
single body (the Army Corps of Engineers) created both organization and
cooperation

between

states,

though

the

cooperation

was,

perhaps,

involuntary. Multi-state projects emphasizing flood control as well as
navigation became more feasible.
In 1936, flood control meant structural mitigation. Organized federal
floodplain management ended with dams and levees. Aside from aid, nonstructural mitigation continued to be left to the states. In 1958, only seven
states had encroachment provisions of any kind (Murphy, 1958). All enacted
encroachment laws following a major event. The extent to which they limited
development varied greatly, but none used the hundred year floodplain as a
guideline. Pennsylvania and Indiana decided encroachment on the basis of
individual projects. Iowa controlled development in the “floodway”, but
neglected to define it. New Jersey’s line of encroachment was the flood of
record, while Massachusetts used the average spring flood. Washington State
considered encroachment individually, and used the channel banks as a
guideline. Connecticut was perhaps the strictest, using a level generally five
times that of the mean annual flood. The multiplicative factor depended on the
river.
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Most states did not enforce permit requirements. In his evaluation of
state encroachment provisions, Murphy states “It appeared that, lacking firm
criteria of channel encroachment, the states tend to establish requirements
that are not in major conflict with existing developments nor unduly restrictive
to new developments” (Murphy, 1958, 20). These considerations took the
form of “re asonableness” when the National Flood Insurance Act was passed
in 1968.

The National Flood Insurance Act
In the 1940’s and 1950’s, Gilbert White (1945, 1954), Francis Murphy
(1958), the Bureau of the Budget (1952), and others recommended a
floodplain management program that went beyond structural mitigation. This
was in no small part due to the approximately 7 billion dollars spent on river
maintenance and “improvements” from 1936 to 1966 (USWRC, 1971, 1979).
Research indicated that, in spite of the outlay for flood control, flood losses
were not decreasing (White’s Interview with Reuss, 1993; Kusler, 1982;
House Doc. 465, 1966; Holmes, 1961; Renshaw, 1961). In order to stem the
outward flow of cash, a combination of zoning and encroachment regulations,
building codes, insurance, and financial incentives and disincentives was
suggested.
Murphy (1958) identified several requirements for successful nonstructural floodplain management. If regulations were to be enforceable, they
must be clear and concise, and set with consistent criteria. In other words,
they must be coded efficiently. Any program must also have sufficient funding.
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“To insure consistency in channel encroachment and zoning
provisions, criteria would have to be established at the federal
leve l…The zoning criteria would concern flood frequency and
areas to be subject to regulation, which would both be delineated
on a zoning map.”(Murphy, 1958, 148).
Though Murphy believed that the state level would be the most appropriate for
administering flood regulations, he saw that the states had very different
management philosophies. He feared that the resulting differences in criteria
would cause inequity. The federal government’s financial resources, existing
staff, and infrastructure also made it a more suitable choice for establishing
and recording criteria. Murphy suggested that the criteria should lie between
the 65 and 100 year floods in order to be effective in reducing losses.
Many of the above suggestions were incorporated into the National
Flood Insurance Act of 1968. As the 1936 Flood Control Act streamlined
structural mitigation, the1968 Act was designed to create a framework for
non-structural mitigation. The Act sought to both reduce losses and distribute
those incurred. The National Flood Insurance Act followed the Southeast
Disaster Act of 1965, a 1966 report on flood insurance commissioned by
HUD, and House Document 465, a report entitled A Unified National Program
for Managing Flood Losses. The report was produced by a task force headed
by Gilbert White and presented to the Bureau of the Budget in 1966. The
National Flood Insurance Act was based in large part on House Document
465, though White was not entirely satisfied with the management results
(Interview with Reuss, 1993). The Act was not a reaction to a specific event,
but spurred on by multiple events, the culmination of long years of research
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and argument regarding the feasibility of federal flood insurance and the move
to non-structural mitigation.
Tobin and Montz (1997) identi fy four possible community responses to
hazards and disasters. Communities can modify the event, modify
vulnerability, modify the loss burden, or do nothing. The National Flood
Insurance Program established in the 1968 Act had three goals: to better
indemnify individuals for flood losses through insurance; to reduce flood
damages through management and regulation; and to reduce federal
expenditures for disaster assistance and flood control (FEMA). These goals
emphasize modifying vulnerability and the loss burden while discouraging
non-action and placing event modification (structural mitigation) within a
broader management framework.
The National Flood Insurance Program is made up of three interrelated components. These include mapping, management, and insurance.
Each is designed to function as part of a whole in achieving the Act’s goals by
encouraging the preferred community responses. Mapping is intended to
increase awareness and assist in both floodplain management and the
creation of rate maps. Management includes the use of zoning, codes, and
permitting in order to decrease vulnerability. Insurance shares the loss burden
and is intended to reduce the reliance on federal aid. Insurance availability
and rates are based on mapped risk zones and documente d management
practices. Compliance is encouraged through rate reductions, as well as the
withholding of insurance, loans, and (in theory) disaster relief.

32

The focal point of each of these components is the “100 year
floodplain”. This is the concise, cons istent criteria that Murphy believed was
necessary for the successful administration of a flood management program.
While flood maps may include other information, the information most
important for administering policy is the designation of the Base Flood
Elevation and the Special Flood Hazard Area. Both of these are based on the
predicted parameters of a flood with a return period of 100 years.
Permits are required for all development within the Special Flood
Hazard Area (SFHA). All new construction must be raised at least 1 foot
above designated Base Flood Elevation. The National Flood Insurance
Program prohibits any construction within the 100 year floodway that raises
the Base Flood Elevation (BFE) 1 foot or more. Insurance is required for all
building within the SFHA, but is unavailable to communities not identified as
having SFHA’s or those that do not meet or enforce the management
requirements above. Levees rated to a 100 year level of protection exempt
the land behind them from the SFHA. Both the management and insurance
components of the National Flood Insurance Program depend on mapping
the100 year flood parameters. Though they are subject to all the uncertainty
of surveying and science, these lines are represented as absolute.

The Hundred Year Flood as Benchmark
How did the 100 year return period become the benchmark of U.S.
flood policy? There was some precedent in the Tennessee Valley Authority’s
use of the “intermediate regional flood” as a structural guideline (White’s
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Interview with Reuss, 1993; Goddard, 1961; Kates and White, 1961), but the
1% chance flood was not widely used prior to the National Flood Insurance
Act. The intermediate regional flood is now equated with the 100 year flood.
When looking at its adoption as the regulatory standard it is necessary to
consider reasonableness, efficiency, and the individuals involved.
Murphy emphasized reasonableness in his 1958 report. He was
speaking of reasonableness regarding specific communities; in 1968
administrators were looking for a reasonable benchmark for all communities.
In order to get the program off the ground, administrators “initially had to have
some figure to use” (White’s Interview with Reuss, 1993). Murphy’s
“reasonableness” took into account the predicted and historical parameters of
flooding, along with community use and need (Murphy, 1958). In 1968,
reasonableness was based on a general cost benefit model. In addition to its
association with the TVA,

the 1% chance flood was chosen because it

“constitutes a reasonable compromise between the need for building
restrictions to minimize potential loss of life and property and the economic
benefits to be derived from floodplain development” (Krimm, 1998).
Reasonableness was not assessed on a contextual basis, but a theoretical
one. What passed as reasonable in policy formation was assumed to be
reasonable throughout the country. Though suggestions were made by
researchers like White, the public was not involved in a policy dialogue. Both
Murphy (1958) and White (Interview with Reuss, 1993) felt that different
criteria for different situations would be more effective than applying a single
criterion to communities with different needs, but other forces were at work.
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The National Flood Insurance Program was broad in scope and its
functionality depended on producing easily readable maps. There was some
pressure to get the program off the ground. In a 1985 interview, Gilbert White
recalls the first FIA administrator as “committed to blanketing the country”
(Interview with Reuss, 1993, 55). There was no pilot program; George
Bernstein dove right in, “making large commitments for surveys, for mapping
programs, and for doing this not using the regular federal agencies, but
bringing in consulting engineers” (White’s Interview with, in Reuss, 1993, 55).
In order to map the nation as quickly as possible, using multiple organizations,
efficiently coded policy requirements were imperative. The resulting maps
were also to be clear, concise, and consistent, able to travel through time and
space without obvious alteration. They, too, needed to be efficiently coded.
The initial goal in adopting the hundred year flood criterion was not
effective communication of risk or risk policy, but efficient administration and
implementation. The effectiveness of this criterion in encouraging desired
behavior, preventing loss, and engendering understanding of risk and policy
was not tested. It has yet to be tested thoroughly. Efficiency was prioritized;
effectiveness was not. Because efficiency was prioritized, a single criterion
was used, chosen because of its perceived “reasonableness”. The efficiency
with which the FIA set about “blanketing” the country, combined with the
efficient verbal and visual coding of the 100 year floodplain, may very well
have led to the institutionalization of the “100 year flood” before its usefulness
to risk policy and risk communication was proven.
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Uncertainty and the Hundred Year Flood
What is the “hundred year flood” intended to represent? It is intended
as a measure of flood risk, though the consequences of such risk are not
addressed. Flood risk is defined as “the probability that one or more events
will exceed a given flood magnitude within a specified period of years”
(USWRC, 1977). For the hundred year flood, this means that an event of a
specific size or larger can be expected, on average, every hundred years.
This does not mean it can not happen multiple times in the same year. The
return period is based on statistical analysis of the historical record, or flood
frequency curves. Historical data can be augmented by comparisons with
similar watersheds and precipitation analysis. The basic formula for obtaining
the return period is
Tr = n + 1/ m
where n equals the number of data entries and m equals the rank of a
specific flood magnitude. Probability is simply the reciprocal, so a flood with a
one hundred year return period has a 1% chance of occurring in any given
year. As with any statistical analysis based on a sample, there is an
associated error and a set of confidence limits. These “uncertainties can be
decreased only by obtaining more or better data and by using better statistical
methods” (USWRC, 1977). They can not be eliminated.
Statistical error is only one potential source of uncertainty in the
concept of the 100 year flood. Using an example from the IAWCD, the
National Research Council (2000) describes probability distribution as a
reflection of “natural variability” and the error bounds as “knowledge
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uncertainty”. Climate change can be included in natural variability, but the
resulting probabilities may be skewed. One must also include mechanical
error and operator error in creating the frequency curves. In addition, these
curves, and the probabilities based on them, may change as use patterns
change in the floodplain and watershed. Maps based on these probabilities
may quickly become obsolete (USWRC, 1982). Lines could also conceivably
be manipulated by those in power.
In addition to the uncertainties associated with determining probability,
flood heights, velocities, and consequences of similarly rated events vary from
place to place, introducing another type of uncertainty. Smith has used this
type of uncertainty to argue that “it is impossible to set definitions for a
designated flood that are universally applicable”

(Smith, 2000, 255). His

argument echoes those set forth by Murphy and White regarding the
suitability of a single criterion. If a risk benchmark is not associated with both
temporal and consequential probability, what does it really mean? Is it useful
for either policy or communication? These concerns have been raised by the
National Research Council (2000) and by Slovic (1986), but the underlying
concepts need to be tested.
As the 100 year flood designation moved out of the arena of
implementation and into the political and public arenas, it lost its associated
uncertainty. Scientists assessing 100 year flood parameters probably shared
a code and underlying context. Embedded in the flood parameters is
uncertainty resulting from both natural variability and human error.
Parameters change with changing conditions and may not include all relevant
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information. At least some of these uncertainties were internalized by those
conducting the studies. Though “experts” tend to privilege defined uncertainty
(Wynne, 1992) and be overconfident in their assessments (Slovic et al.,
1979), uncertainty is a part of their context. Other people’s contexts and
coding systems are not as tolerant of uncertainty.
An efficiently coded message will be filtered differently by politicians
and by the general public than by those who originally produced its content.
The underlying context and symbol set is different. Uncertainty is likely to be
eliminated as the incoming message is recoded into existing categories. The
message will be particularly malleable if the code is recognizable and
potentially relevant, as is the case with the hundred year flood. The
differences in contextual meaning may not be immediately obvious. Thus, as
the hundred year flood was quickly institutionalized, its uncertainty morphed
into certainty, “rapidly transformed in the community mind to a definition of
flood free and flood prone, with areas above the designated flood perceived to
be flood free – a misconception often reinforced by flood maps that shade
only those portions that are subject to the designated flood” (Smith, 2000,
255). More research is needed to confirm this, but the assertion is plausible.
General risk communication research supports this conclusion (Hance et al.,
1988). Kates and White (1961) also indicate that map lines, like levees, may
produce a false sense of security. Efficient communication, perhaps
inadvertently, has succeeded in making effective communication very difficult.
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Communication and the Hundred Year Flood
Since the implementation of the National Flood Insurance Program,
many (e.g. Wood et al., 1985; NRC, 2000; Smith, 2000; Fordham, 2000) have
recommended the adoption of public participation in flood risk analysis and
policy making. The National Flood Insurance Act was passed prior to this
phase

in

risk

communication.

However,

public

participation

in

the

communication of flood risk continues to lag behind that of some technological
risks and associated policies. This may in part be due to the lack of outrage
associated with hazards like nuclear power and the consequent differences in
perception (Sandman, 1987).
In the beginning, communication of flood policy to the public was a
secondary concern and took the “decide, announce, defend” route.
Communication is becoming a primary concern, though it continues to
assume a narrow, engineering model. Effectiveness is judged on compliance
with the NFIP, not on the understanding of its principles. Flood risk
communicators now believe that persuasion is contingent upon understanding
of the uncertainty concepts originally associated with the hundred year flood
(NRC, 1995, 2000). However, it is not clear that a better perception of
uncertainty and probability will bring the risk perception of expert and general
public closer togeth er or induce a desired response.
In the narrow model of risk communication, flood risk information is
assumed to be transferred from experts to a general audience via maps,
pamphlets, and policy. The message travels through intended channels.
Because of the efficiency of the message and the shared language of experts
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and public, a shared code was initially assumed. However, in using the
hundred year flood as the basis of verbal and visual communication, risk
communicators substituted a contextual sub-group (the experts) for the public
as the target audience. No research on message appropriateness was done
prior to the implementation of the NFIP. Sub-contexts and symbol sets were
merged. Potential differences in context were not addressed and by the time
risk communicators were concerned with context, new meanings were
entrenched.
A narrow model does not take into account informal communication. It
cannot explain the compounding of error as a message makes its way
through different contexts on unintended routes. It assumes that flood risk
information is received only through the channels in which it was initially sent.
The assumption of the narrow model of risk communication was perhaps a
contributor to the rapid institutionalization of a flawed probability concept.
Other paths, other sources, and other contexts were not considered. Future
communication of flood risk would be wise to adopt a broad communication
model in order to better anticipate perception and behavior, to appropriately
tailor a message, and to encourage a dialogue of stake holders (Fordham,
2000). Aspects of the broad model have been encouraged by the National
Research Council (1995, 2000), but there is more research to be done. The
“ideal” communication recommended in the 2000 report contin ues to reflect
the narrow model outlined by Covello et al (1987).
Government agencies recognize the inadequacy of “the hundred year
flood” in communicating flood risk and the danger of reinforcing risk
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dichotomies (NRC, 1995, 2000; USACE Guidelines). Ove r half of flood losses
occur outside of the Special Flood Hazard Area (Smith, 2000; Faber, 1996) .
There has been a move to adopt more effective terminology without forsaking
the efficiency necessary to carry out a nationwide program. The focus has
been on the verbal, rather than the visual representation of uncertainty
concepts. The Army Corps of Engineers has altered its Principles and
Guidelines in an attempt to recapture uncertainty; the objective is to use the
probability term “1 percent chance flood” instead of using the return period.
Publications, however, show that the Guidelines are not always adhered to
(USACE, 1994).
In 2000, the National Research Council suggested several messages
thought to better convey uncertainty, though the usefulness of the hundred
year floodplain as a policy benchmark was upheld. Suggested terminology
included the 1 percent chance flood, percent chance of flooding during a 30
year mortgage (essentially a 1 in 4, or 26 percent chance), and an analogy
linking the chance of flooding in 50 years to the chance of tossing a coin and
coming up with heads (NRC, 2000). Including damage potential with this
description of probability is also suggested. Other organizations, like the
Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, suggest a similar shift in terminology (Faber,
1996). The TVA uses the 26 percent chance in a 30 year period in its
communication (Newton, 1987). Unfortunately, a glance through publications
from areas using the 1 percent chance flood to communicate risk indicates
that this message may be as ineffective as that of the 100 year flood. After all,
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there’s

“a

99

percent

chance

of

it

not

happening!”

(coxsmeadow.homestead.com).
Arkin (1987) has emphasized the importance of carefully testing
messages prior to official communication. However, the suggested terms, like
the 100 year flood before them, have not yet been tested as to their efficacy in
influencing the public understanding of uncertainty concepts. It may be that
they reflect the same communicative problems as the 100 year flood. Nor is
there much evidence that they will produce similar qualitative perceptions of
risk or levels of concern across contexts, even when uncertainty is accepted.
The usefulness of an overhaul of verbal coding must also be questioned,
since the visual coding of flood risk information may not reflect the desired
changes in communication.

Problem Statement

In the creation of United States flood policy, efficient implementation
took precedence over effective communication. The efficient coding of “the
hundred year flood” and the scope of the National Flood Insurance Program
led to a pervasive use of the term in formal and informal risk communication.
When officials began consciously communicating flood policy to the public,
they assumed a narrow “engineering” model and did not fully anticipate the
influence of informal communication or contextual differences in meaning. The
effectiveness of the “hundred year flood” as a means to change attitude or
motivate behavior was not assessed. Nor was its utility in increasing public
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understanding of flood risk. Perception of the hundred year flood and the
term’s effic acy in policy communication has yet to be thoroughly analyzed.
New terms have been introduced, but the effectiveness of “the 1 percent
chance flood”, “26 percent chance in 30 years”, and the analogy of the coin
flip are also unproven. It may be difficult to replace hundred year flood
terminology in risk communication regardless of the usefulness of the new
terms. It would, however, make sense to test them before attempting to move
forward.
This project will attempt to answer the following questions within the
context of the case study area:
1. What is the public perception of the hundred year flood in terms of
probability and risk?
2. Is “hundred year flood” terminology effective in communicating flood
risk?
3. Is the visual representation of the hundred year flood effective in
communicating flood risk?
4. Are the terms introduced as replacements for or augmentations of
“the hundred year flood” more effective in communicating flood risk?
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Hypotheses

Comparisons of Effectiveness
1. It is hypothesized that the hundred year flood will be perceived by the
public to be regular and predictable and considered a moderate to low
risk.
2. It is expected th at an event described as having a 1% chance of
occurring will be perceived more accurately in terms of its random
nature, but will be considered a low risk.
3. It is hypothesized that events described as having a 26% chance of
occurring in a 30 year period will be perceived as a moderate threat
and more uncertain than a hundred year flood.
4. It is further hypothesized that current maps are perceived to illustrate
absolute boundaries, failing to convey uncertainty or effectively
communicate flood risk.

Situational Relationships to Perception
5. Individuals with personal experience with flooding are predicted to have
a better understanding of the uncertainties of the hundred year flood
and may exhibit a level of concern more consistent with policy.
6. It is also exp ected that the perceived risk will increase with age and be
higher for women than for men.
7. Accurate perception of uncertainty is expected to increase with
education
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Chapter Two: Physical and Social Context

Site Selection

Several criteria were used in selecting an appropriate case study area.
These included community size, National Flood Insurance Program status,
floodplain proportion, and flood experience. Constraints on data collection
limited potential sites to single small communities; a small population makes
data collection easier and increases the chances that a sample will be
representative.
The second criterion was the community’s status in the National Flood
Insurance Program. A community that participates in the NFIP has a
designated Special Flood Hazard Area, a recorded 100 year flood elevation,
and available maps. In theory, the community will have been exposed to both
flooding and the terms used to describe flood risk. In this project, participation
in the Community Rating System (CRS) was not looked upon as desirable for
the selected site. The vast majority (approximately 20,000) of flood prone
communities are involved in the NFIP, but only 994 have earned CRS points.
Communities earn CRS points by exceeding the requirements of the NFIP.
Examples of activities rewarded by CRS are education programs, relocation
programs and buyouts, storm water planning, structural measures, and
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warning systems. A community that does not participate in the CRS is
perhaps more representative of other most flood plain communities.
The third criterion was floodplain proportion. If the project was to
include analysis of perception and behavior both in and out of the floodplain,
the community could not be completely contained within the SFHA or the 500
year floodplain. Nor would it make sense to use a community whose residents
lived and conducted business almost exclusively outside either floodplain.
Flooding needed to be a legitimate public and personal concern.
The final criterion was flood experience. For flooding to be a public and
personal concern, the community selected needed to have recent experience
with floods large and small, including a 100 year flood. This flood should have
been discussed in terms of return period in local forums.
The Village of Wimberley, Texas was chosen as the research site.
While it serves a portion of the greater Wimberley Valley, the city itself is fairly
small, consisting of 2,710 people according to the 2003 Census Bureau
estimate. The community currently participates in the Na tional Flood
Insurance Program (NFIP) and has since 2002. The city incorporated in 2000.
Prior to 2002, the Wimberley area participated in the NFIP through Hays
County; the county has been a member of the NFIP since 1993. Neither the
city nor the county is involved in the Community Rating System, though some
in the community were curious to learn more about it. Wimberley has several
neighborhoods both in and out of the floodplain and has experienced a variety
of flood events over the last 10 years, some of which were quite large. In
addition, the population of Wimberley is growing, and not all the immigrants
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are from flood prone communities. This quality will aid in analyzing the effects
of experience on perception and behavior.

Physical Context

Wimberley is located 30 miles southwest of Austin and 50 miles
northeast of San Antonio. It is the largest of several small towns in Hays
county, including Dripping Springs, Driftwood, Buda, and Kyle. San Marcos,
home of Texas State University, is the county seat as well as the area’s
population center. San Marcos is 15 miles southeast of Wimberley. Figures
2.1 and 2.2 illustrate the location of Hays County and Wimberley, respectively.

Figure 2.1. Hays County Location

Source: www.geonames.usgs.gov
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Figure 2.2. Wimberley Location

Source: www.visitwimberley.com

Hill Country
Hays county marks the eastern edge of Texas hill country, a 36,000
square mile area riddled with canyons extending over portions of 25 counties.
Hill Country covers parts of two physiographic regions, including the Llano
Uplift and the Edwards Plateau. The smaller Uplift is primarily igneous and is
punctuated with rounded granitic hills. It contains some of the oldest rocks in
Texas. The Edwards Plateau surrounds the Llano Uplift and is chiefly
limestone (TPWD, 2004; TSHA, 2002). Several rivers, including the Frio,
48

Medina, Nueces, Llano, Pedernales, Guadalupe, and the Blanco cut through
the softer rock of the Hill Country, as do many named and unnamed creeks
and streams. The Trinity and Edwards aquifers underlie much of the area,
sending springs bubbling to the surface in New Braunfels, Comal, San
Marcos, and many other places (TWDB, TSHA, 2002). Plant communities are
dominated by live oak - juniper parks and woods, with live oak - mesquite
communities more common in the uplift region. Canyons contain other oak
species and hardwoods, including black cherry, pecan, hackberry, and Texas
mountain laurel (TPWD, 2004; TSHA, 2002). Bald cypress are common along
the streams.

Hays County
Hays County straddles the Balcones Escarpment, a fault that marks the
divide between the Edwards Plateau and the Blackland Prairie Region.
Rangeland is predominant in the northwestern portion of the county, as the
thin soils and relief make the land inappropriate for most crops. The
southeastern third of the county is situated on the inland sweep of the coastal
plains; the dark clay soils are thicker and richer than those of the Plateau
(TPWD, 2004; TSHA, 2002). Most native vegetation has been cleared for
cropland. Texas’s natural regions are included in Figure 2.3; Hays county is
colored blue.
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Figure 2.3. Natural Regions of Texas

Hays County
Source: TPWD, 2004

Water in Hays County runs from northwest to southeast, following the
elevation change through the Escarpment. The Blanco and San Marcos
Rivers are the major waterways, but there are others that can, and have,
caused damage. For the most part, the Blanco flows freely, though Hays
County contains some small off channel flood control dams located on private
property and paid for by the federal and county governments. These were
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credited with reducing losses during the 1998 floods (GBRA, 1999). The
southern half of Hays County, including Wimberley, lies within the Guadalupe
Blanco watershed (see Figure 2.4). The Guadalupe Basin includes ten
counties and drains an area of 1,652 square miles. The Blanco feeds the San
Marcos River and joins the Guadalupe near Gonzales. This smaller basin
drains an area of approximately 355 square miles (USGS). The entire
Guadalupe River Basin has been called ‘Flash Flood Alley’ and is one of the
three most dangerous regions in the U.S. for flash floods (GBRA, 1999). It is
of particular importance in areas such as these to effectively communicate
flood risk and encourage appropriate behavior in both individuals and
communities.
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Figure 2.4. Guadalupe River Basin

Source: Gaudalupe-Blanco River Trust
Numbers refer to gauging stations.
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The Village of Wimberley
The heart of the Village of Wimberley is located at the confluence of
Cypress Creek and the Blanco River (see Figure 2.5). Wilson Creek enters
the Blanco west of downtown and numerous washes run through
neighborhoods. These washes are often not included on flood risk maps, but
residents indicated that these washes have caused flooding and damage.
Like that of most of Hill Country, Wimberley’s bedrock is primarily limestone,
and soils are generally thin. Elevations range from 780 to 1260 feet above sea
level (TSHA, 2002). Wimberley’s topography and geology puts the population
at some risk, though open space and vegetative cover are generally
abundant, allowing for some infiltration.

Figure 2.5. Central Wimberley Topography and Rivers

Source: www.Topozone.com

UTM 14 587076E 3318373N (WGS84/NAD83)
USGS Wimberley Quad
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Social Context

A Brief History of Wimberley
When Hays County was founded in 1848, Wimberley was a trading
post known as Glendale. The population was very small and unsettled. In the
early 1850’s, William Winters discovered the spot and moved his family onto
200 acres near the confluence of Cypress Creek and the Blanco River. In
1956, he built a limestone house and a mill. The mill was originally used for
lumber; a grist mill was added shortly thereafter. The surrounding area came
to be called Winter’s Mill. When Winters died in 1864, his son-in-law John
Crude took over mill operations and repaired flood damage to the mill.
Crude’s Mill was sold to Pleasant Wimberley in 1874 and the name changed
to Wimberley’s mill. In 1880, the town applied for recognition from the Post
Office and became Wimberley (Allen, 1986; TSHA, 2002; Wimberley History).
Through the course of the community’s early years, the power of
Cypress Creek was used to produce lumber, grist, flour, sorghum, molasses,
shingles, and cotton. In 1912, the Creek could no longer power mill
operations. The mill closed in 1925 and was razed in 1934 (Allen, 1986;
TSHA, 2002; Wimberley History). It presumably sustained major damage
during the 1929 flood and may have been unsalvageable. The original site is
currently occupied by a bank; the town square is just across the creek.
Wimberley’s economy changed in the post war boom. With improved
roads, Wimberley and the rest of hill country became accessible. Austin and
San Antonio were growing quickly, and many began to look outside the cities
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for relief and leisure. In the 1950’s and 1960’s, Wimberley began to support a
growing community of part time residents staying in weekend and summer
homes. Tourism also increased as vacation lodging was built (Allen, 1986;
TSHA, 2002). The trend has continued; one third of Wimberley’s businesses
are directly related to tourism (Wimberley Comprehensive Plan, 2002). In the
past few decades, more of Wimberley’s visitors have decided to stay,
contributing to a boom in the population.

Demographics
In 2000, Wimberley’s population as a Census Designated Place was
3,797. Its estimated 2000 population as an incorporated city was 2,583. In
2003, the city population was estimated at 2,710. Wimberley is predominantly
white (91.2 percent) with the largest minority group being the 6.9 percent who
identified themselves as Hispanic of any race. English was not the primary
language of 11.3 percent of the residents. In 2000, 41.2 percent of
Wimberley’s

population

held

a

Bachelor’s

degree

or

higher,

while

approximately 11 percent did not have a high school diploma or the
equivalent. The median age of the population in 2000 was 45.6 with a median
household income of $46,042. In general, Wimberley’s population is
significantly whiter and older, somewhat better educated, and slightly
wealthier than the rest of Hays County or Texas. Comparisons of Census
2000 data are included in Table 2.1.
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Table 2.1. Demographic Comparison of Wimberley, Hays County, and Texas
Using 2000 Census Data
Wimberley CDP

Hays County

Texas

Population

3,797

97,589

20,851,820

% White, Non-Hispanic

91.2%

64.5%

52.4%

% Hispanic of Any Race

6.9%

29.6%

32.0%

% English as a Second
Language

11.3%

23.1%

31.2%

% with Bachelors or
Higher

41.2%

31.3%

23.2%

Median Age

45.6

28.4

32.3

Median Income

$46,042

$45,006

$39,927

Growth
Current Wimberley residents are concerned about growth, though the
slogan atop the local paper and website, “A Nice Place to Visit… a Great
Place to Live”, appears to encourage it. In 2003, Wimberley was rated one of
the top 10 small towns in the c ountry by Travel Holiday Magazine. Many have
heeded the call and settled here, including a large number of retirees. Others
have also come, and ‘locals’ are worried about maintaining the bucolic way of
life that first brought them to Wimberley. One section of the 2002 Wimberley
Comprehensive Plan is devoted to growth management. Another section
deals with community character. So far, Wimberley has managed to keep
business fairly local, avoid chains, and encourage the arts.
Growth has other potential impacts. Increased development puts more
stress on the water supply. More relevant to this study, development reduces
infiltration, increases run-off, and potentially puts more people at the mercy of
larger floods, even when zoning is enforced. And while the Comprehensive
Plan states that, “Particular attention should be given to preparing for periodic
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major flooding” (Wimberley Comprehensive Plan, 2002), it is not explicitly
incorporated into other aspects of planning. References are made to
waterfront de velopment, but flood education is not mentioned. From a preevent perspective, this could be problematic, though flood response has been
actively addressed through the fire department and Wimberley EMS as well
as CERT (Citizen Emergency Response Team). CERT currently has 20
members and is actively recruiting. Emergency response organizations hold
regular flood specific trainings (www.visitwimberley.com/cert).
Another potential problem is the lack of collective memory in the
newcomers. Those with experience may have made mental and physical
adjustments to frequent flooding unavailable to new residents without targeted
education. Growth will continue to be a concern as Austin and San Antonio
spread. Historic Census records are unavailable for Wimberley itself, and
census tracts have changed significantly. Historical data are available for
Hays County, however, and illustrate the growth patterns of the region. Figure
2.6 shows huge growth from 1970 – 2003, with a jump of 61.6 percent from
1980 to 1990. If the growth rate continues as estimated, the percent change
will be over 50 percent in 2010.
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Figure 2.6. Hays County Population Growth, 1950 – 2003
Hays County Population Growth and Percent Change, 1900 - 2003
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Meteorological and Hydrological Context

Weather and Climate
Located at 29°59’50” N and 90°80’04” W, Wimberley has rather mild
winters and hot summers, bordering humid and semi-arid regions. Wimberley
receives a mean 300 days of sunlight per year, with a growing season of
approximately 254 days. January is usually the coldest month, averaging
40°F, while July, with an average temperature of 96°F, is the hottest.
Mean yearly precipitation is 33.75 inches, with the majority of rain
falling in late spring and fall. Spring rainfall is usually frontal. The bulk of
summer and autumnal rainfall is generated through convective thunderstorm
activity, though frontal precipitation is also common in later months (NWS,
TSHA, 2002). The area is impacted by hurricane related precipitation as well.
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These violent rainfall types contribute to the flash flooding for which the
Guadalupe Basin is known. Average monthly rainfall is shown in Figure 2.7.
Snow is rare. National Weather Service information is for Austin, which has an
annual average of 33.42” and a pattern comparable to that of Wimberley.

Figure 2.7. Austin Average Monthly Rainfall
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The City and Its Surface Water
As illustrated in Figure 2.5, Wimberley lies at the confluence of the
Blanco River and Cypress Creek. The square, which is the tourist and
business center of the village, is bordered on the north and west by Cypress
Creek. The Blanco marks its southern edge. Many residences are also
located near these two waterways, as well as near Wilson Creek and other
creeks and washes. While the majority of the population does live outside the
Special Flood Hazard Area, flooding is a very real threat to both personal and
public property.
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Farm Road 12, one of Wimberley’s major thoroughfares, crosses both
Cypress Creek and the Blanco River. One of the Blanco’s gauge stations is
located at the RR 12 bridge. Cypress Creek is not gauged. The bridges are
located just to the north and south of downtown. The firehouse is north of the
Blanco and west of Cypress Creek, north of both bridges. The firehouse is
one of the centers of emergency response for the community and is located
outside both the 100 year and 500 year floodplains. However, if either bridge
is flooded, responders are cut off from much of their service area. The
Cypress Creek bridge has been more problematic and a project is currently
under way to bring it up to flood standards (and relieve congestion).
Many neighborhoods also have only one way in and out; during flood
events, these neighborhoods are stranded. Luckily, flood waters usually
recede relatively quickly, but this is not always the case. The multiple low
water crossings are also of concern. An example is shown in Figure 2.7. What
is ‘safe’ for one vehicle is not safe for another and though these crossings are
marked ‘closed’ by local officials when the river stage rises above a few feet,
there is a lag between the time the river reaches a dangerous level and the
time the crossing is closed. Closings are not always respected. Additionally,
the existence of these low water crossings may encourage residents to drive
through flowing water, a dangerous practice in an area prone to flash flooding.
In Texas, the majority of flood related deaths are caused by driving into
floodwaters (www.floodsafety.com).

60

Flood History
River stages and discharges have been recorded for the Blanco River
at Wimberley since 1924. There are no gauges for Cypress Creek; flooding is
reported through local estimates and damages. In recent years, Cypress
Creek has caused more extensive damage than the Blanco in the Wimberley
area, and though its flooding is related to that of the Blanco, it is not
dependent upon it. The creek is only 14 miles long, but it might warrant its
own monitoring system.
Flood stage for the Blanco at Wimberley’s RR 12 bridge is 13 feet.
According to the USGS, since 1925, the annual peak of the river has
surpassed flood stage on 24 occasions. The number increases if one includes
non peak flows in high volume years. Of the 24 floods, 5 were considered to
be ‘major’ by the National Weather Service, having exceeded 26 feet. 17 feet
is categorized as moderate. The largest flood of record occurred on May 28 th,
1929. USGS records the stage at 31.10 feet with a discharge of 113,000 cfs,
18.10 feet above flood stage. The National Weather Service puts the stage at
33.30 feet, with the same discharge. Regardless of who’s right, the 1929 flood
is still used as a point of reference by survey respondents who were in
Wimberley at the time. Figure 2.8 shows the annual peaks of the Blanco at
Wimberley from 1925 – 2003, recorded by the USGS.
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Figure 2.8. Annual Peak Discharge of the Blanco at Wimberley, 1925 – 2003

USGS and National Weather Service data are not consistent. Table 2.2
includes the stage and discharge of the top five floods as recorded by the
National Weather Service.

Table 2.2. National Weather Service Peak Flows for the Blanco at Wimberley
Rank

Date

Stage in Feet

Discharge in cfs

1

5-28-1929

33.30

113,000

2

11-16-2001

28.89

NR

3

10-17-1998

28.50

116,000

4

7-5-2002

25.71

66,700

5

6-9-1997

20.46

34,100

According to NWS Austin/San Antonio, four of the five highest peaks
have occurred in the last seven years. USGS recorded a similar stage for the
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2002 flood, but because it occurred in the same water year as the November,
2001 flood, it was not included in their yearly peaks. However, the USGS
recorded discharge for the 1998 flood was only 88,500 cfs. Four floods that
surpassed the 1997 mark were not included in the NWS top ten, let alone the
top five. USGS has both the 1952 flood and the 1958 flood surpassing 30 feet
with discharges close to 100,000 cfs. Nevertheless, the four out of five
statistic is often quoted by lay people.
The four floods cited by the NWS were large and damaging (though
only 2 qualify as major by their standards), but few people aside from the fire
chief appeared to remember the impacts of the floods in the 1950’s. Collective
memory appears to have been replaced through informal and accidental
communication. The void is filling itself. In an area where people’s lives and
livelihoods are at risk, discrepancies of this magnitude are inexcusable.
According to Slovic (1993), competing information is a sure was to break the
public trust. Trust is essential to effective risk communication (Covello et al.,
1987; B. Johnson, 1987).
Of the most recent floods in the Wimberley area, the 1998 October
flood caused the most extensive damage, though its stage and discharge
were surpassed by the 2001 flood. Most of the damage in the greater
Wimberley area occurred along Cypress Creek and in Woodcreek, just north
of Wimberley. The 2001 flood devastated other areas of the Guadalupe Basin,
but got little to no coverage in the local paper, and several survey participants
who sustained damage from the Blanco mentioned that it was harder to get
assistance than in 1998. Local organizations were not as active. Many who
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did not live on the Blanco did not realize that the 2001 flood had done any
local damage. The 2002 flood got some local coverage, as it happened
around the July 4th holiday and produced a 25.71 foot crest, but festivities
continued and there was little damage reported. The 1997 flood also caused
significant damage in Woodcreek and along Cypress Creek, but Blanco flows
were much lower than those of other floods.

The 1998 October Flood
Those living along the Blanco tended to use 2001 as a reference point
during the interviews. However, the 1998 flood appeared to be a life marker
for the community as whole. The storm was centered n
i southern Hays
County, damage was more widespread, and there was less lead time than for
the other storms mentioned. The reference pattern described above, along
with individual references to the 1929 and 1958 floods by those who had
experienced them, supports the work of Lave and Lave (1991), who found
that people focus on the largest, most destructive flood of their own
experience, regardless of when it happened.
The storm precipitating the 1998 flood came on quickly. Two hurricanes
in the Gulf of Mexico, an upper level trough, and a cold front combined to
produce massive amounts of rain in Comal, Hays, and Guadalupe Counties
on the 17 th and 18th of October, 1998. (GBRA, 1999; Slade and Persky,
1999). USGS estimates Wimberley received over 12 inches of rain in 3 ½
hours. Two day totals for Hays County were believed to top 30 inches. Figure
2.9 illustrates precipitation and gauge locations.
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Figure 2.9. Rainfall for Oct. 17th and 18th, 1998

Source: USGS

In the Guadalupe and San Antonio Basins, 13 gauges recorded
discharges with a return period equal to or greater than 100 years. Records
were broken at 11 stations. Wimberley’s discharge of 88,500 cfs was
considered a 100 year flood (Slade and Persky, 1999). The storm’s
hydrograph is included as Figure 2.10. Note that the line is the daily mean,
while the “x” is the measured peak. The difference indicates the speed and
quantity of the storm water.
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Figure 2.10. Hydrograph for the Blanco at Wimberley

Slade and Patton (2002) reported 32 two lives lost and an estimated
500 million dollars in property damage. Floodsafety.com, a collaboration of
federal and regional Texas organizations, reported approximately 1.5 billion
dollars in total damage. In 1999, the Guadalupe Blanco River Authority
recorded 12 basin deaths due to the flood and estimated 11,699 destroyed or
damaged structures. Approximate disaster assistance in the basin totaled
$117,178,905. In Hays County, 1,040 structures suffered significant damage
(GBRA) and Floodsafety.com reported one fatality. In San Marcos, the Warm
Springs Hospital was forced to evacuate as 8 feet of water made its way
inside.
The Blanco was not reported to have flooded any houses in Wimberley,
but the heavy local rains flooded Dry Cypress Creek and Cypress Creek; the
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Creeks were further backed up by the Blanco. The fire chief estimated that
Cypress Creek rose to 17 feet, covering the RR 12 bridge. On October 31 st,
the local press reported the possible condemnation of a housing
development. It is believed that 22 houses were destroyed and 17 suffered
major damage (Allen, 1998). Another 21 sustained minor damage. The Red
Cross estimated that 1.9 million dollars in damage had been done to local
residences. 22 businesses were reported damaged, though in only two cases
was the damage over 40%. Twelve people were rescued from Cypress Creek
(Allen, 1998; Bond, 1998).
Because other communities had suffered even more serious damage,
FEMA did not arrive in Wimberley until ten days after the flood. Local
organizations and large corporations took up the immediate slack, collecting
donations and providing food, water, and shelter for displaced and needy
residents. The successful local response reinforces Hughey’s (2003) findings
regarding the importance of close internal ties in small communities. The
Wimberley View reported that the Wimberley Intercommunity Network (WIN),
a group of 15 churches and other organizations formed after the 1997 floods,
dispersed over $20,000. United Airlines flew in a plane of donations the day
after the flood and sponsored a fundraiser. WIN also raised another $6,000
dollars in a December benefit for the flood victims. Many other businesses
and individuals provided support, though this is not evident in the survey
results.
The 1998 flood was officially considered a 100 year flood, though many
residents have assigned it a return period they think more appropriate, making
67

a mental adjustment towards regularity. Other la rge floods have followed and
preceded it. Some survey respondents linked the floods to development, but
dismissed natural irregularity. The physical location of Wimberley and its
rapidly increasing population necessitate making flood management a priority,
before and after the inevitable event. Integrated planning and education might
help, but the information must be appropriate. Hopefully this project will aid in
the assessment.
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Chapter Three: Study Design

Introduction

Any attempt to address a problem statement or test hypotheses must
start with an appropriate data set. For this project, data were collected using a
face-to-face structured questionnaire. Interviews lasted from 12 to 30 minutes.
Oppenheim (1966) identifies 10 stages of successful social survey
design. These stages are reflected in the eight components of geographic
field work proposed by Lounsbury and Aldrich (1979) and the seven steps of
the survey process described by Rodeghier (1996). When combined, these
guidelines provide a useful research model. Each of the following aspects of
survey research and design are required for the completion of a project:

1.

A clear statement of the problem;

2.

Formulating the hypotheses;

3.

Determining the research area;

4.

Reviewing the relevant literature;

5.

Selecting the sample;

6.

Designing the questionnaire;

7.

Collecting the data;

8.

Coding and cleaning the data; and

9.

Examining, analyzing, and reporting the data.
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The first four components were addressed in Chapters One and Two. This
Chapter will deal with numbers 5 through 9.

Selecting the Sample and Collecting the Data

A stratified random sample was used in order to most effectively
replicate the geographic and socio-economic characteristics of the population.
The target population consisted of all adults over 18 living in Wimberley who
could complete a questionnaire in English. Subgroups were created
geographically, delineated between those in either the 100 year or 500 year
floodplain and those outside an official floodplain. Five neighborhoods were
chosen as appropriate sampling clusters using the 1998 Flood Insurance Rate
Map for Hays County unincorporated areas. Two neighborhoods were located
almost entirely within either the 100 or 500 year floodplain, while three were
mixed to varying degrees. Two neighborhoods were primarily affected by
Cypress and Wilson Creeks, the remainder by the Blanco River. Of the 45
who participated, 26 lived in one of the two designated floodplains.
Within the identified neighborhoods, sampling was random. Up to three
main streets were selected in each neighborhood. On each street, the
sampling process began with a coin toss to decide on which side of the street
to start. On the selected side, every other house was approached. If no one
was home, residents of the next house were contacted. Every third house was
approached on the opposite side. Interviews were conducted over a two week
period from the 28th of July to the 10 th of August, 2004 from 11 A.M to 6:30
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P.M. Though several interviews were completed on both weekends, the time
frame may have contributed to a sample slightly older than the target
population (see Section Three of Chapter Four).

Designing the Questionnaire

The questionnaire was used to assess the effectiveness of the four
methods most commonly used to convey flood risk. These include the one
hundred year flood, the 1 percent chance flood, the 26 percent chance in 30
year flood, and a flood risk map. Survey data were also used to identify
alternative methods and explore the relationship of certain situational factors
to perception and behavior. The questionnaire consisted of three sections
relating to individual flood history and experience, methods of description, and
demographic information. The questionnaire is included as Appendix A.

Evaluating Effectiveness
Effectiveness can be measured through the success of a message in
bringing behavior and attitude in line with that desired by the communicator. It
can also be measured by the level of understanding engendered in the
receiver. This project used both methods to evaluate the effectiveness of the
descriptive methods listed above.
Allison Godber (2002) has used public policy guidelines to represent
the level of risk accepted by local governments. This study used policy
standards to represent the behavior and level of concern policy makers wish
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the public to display. U.S. flood policy has deemed that living in the hundred
year floodplain without insurance or other mitigation strategies is an
unacceptable risk. Policy views it as an area of high risk and high concern.
Expressed levels of concern and the perceived need for protection were used
to measure effectiveness as persuasion. Understanding focused on the
uncertainty concepts embedded in the four methods of description.
Effectiveness as understanding was assessed using the public’s perception of
uncertainty in each of the verbal and visual codes.

Situational Factors
The first section of the survey was used to gather information on
participants’ flood experience. Included were ques tions on both flood
frequency and damage. This section also addressed past flood behavior and
information issues. The third section was used to collect socio -economic data
including education, age, gender, income, and length of residence. These
data were used to determine whether or not the sample was representative
and to identify perceptual and behavioral patterns.

Validity and Reliability
Face validity and content validity were assessed throughout the
development of the questionnaire. Pre-tests were administered to 10 people
to improve clarity, content, and flow. In order to increase reliability and validity,
the questionnaire consisted primarily of closed questions and made use of
Likert, nominal, and ordinal scales. To further increase validity, responses to
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individual questions were combined using factor analysis to form broader
scales of uncertainty, persuasion, and experience. The internal consistency
reliability of these scales was evaluated using Cronbach’s Alpha. The
creation and testing of these new scales is addressed more thoroughly in
Chapter Five.

Coding and Analysis

Coding was made less subjective through the use of closed questions.
Data analysis was primarily quantitative, using Simstat for Windows to
perform standard statistical procedures. Comparisons of effectiveness were
made using one-tailed paired t-tests at alpha = 0.05. Variables with somewhat
skewed

distributions

were

tested

using

Wilcoxon

sign

rank

tests.

Relationships between situational factors, perception, and behavior were
evaluated using independent t-tests, likelihood ratios, and Pearson’s product
moment correlation coefficients. Though the majority of analysis was
quantitative, the face to face format allowed for qualitative analysis as well,
adding depth and context to the results.
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Chapter Four: Descriptive Analysis

Introduction

As described in the previous Chapter, survey questions were grouped
into three main sections. Each section included a varying number of
subsections. The results are grouped accordingly and presented in tabular
form using numerical and percentage totals. A fourth section consisting of
thematically related questions is also presented. Means are used where
appropriate. A total of 45 people participated in the survey; four declin ed.
In the first section of the survey, questions dealt with individuals’
personal flood histories. Also included were questions on respondents’
familiarity with flood programs and information. The second section consisted
of questions regarding people’s understanding of flood risk and their
subsequent attitudes toward flooding. Three verbal methods and one visual
method were used to describe a flood of the same theoretical size. Verbal
methods included the ‘100 year flood’, ‘a flood with a 1 percent chance of
occurring in any year’, and ‘a flood with a 26 percent chance of occurring in 30
years’. The visual method consisted of a Project Impact flood map readily
available on the internet (see Appendix B). The questions in the third section
were used to gather basic demographic information. The fourth section
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includes the results of questions designed to suggest other useful methods of
communicating flood risk (see Appendix A).

Section 1: Respondents’ Personal Flood History

Flood Experience
Table 4.1 includes the results of questions pertaining to flood
experience as measured by frequency. Experience in terms of both frequency
and impact has been shown to be a key factor in perception and response
(Tobin and Montz, 1997). These questions concerned the number of times a
person’s home or property, workplace, or community was flooded in his or her
lifetime, as well as the number of times his or her current home or property
has flooded. All questions were open ended; groupings are for presentation
purposes only. Response values of over 50 floods were given for both
Lifetime Home and Lifetime Community variables. Individual experience was
clustered around low values; community experience had a somewhat more
normal distribution. Both the mean and median are given for each variable.
The variables in Table 4.2 examine experience in terms of impact.
Participants were given a card listing potential damages and asked to identify
those they had experienced at any point in their lives. The table shows the
number of affirmative responses for each damage type mentioned by more
than 5 percent of the sample. Not surprisingly in an area of frequent flooding
and few through roads, 64 percent of those interviewed had experienced
disrupted transportation. One person acknowledged structural damage and
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another the death of a family member or friend. No affirmative responses
were recorded for either crop damage or injury. Damages other than those
listed below were cited by 7 percent of the respondents and included damage
to docks or peripheral decks. One person witnessed a stranger drown. Of the
45 people who participated in the survey, 11 claimed they had never
experienced any damage due to flooding.

Table 4.1. Flood Experience
Number of Times flooded
0

1-5

6-10

#.

%

#

%

#

%

Over 11
#
%

#

Total
%

Current
Home or
Property

26

58%

16

36%

2

4%

1

2%

45

Lifetime
Home or
Property

18

40%

23

51%

3

7%

1

2%

Lifetime
Workplace

38

84%

6

13%

1

2%

0

Lifetime
Community

3

7%

22

49%

12

27%

8

M edian

Mean

100%

0.00

1.82

45

100%

1.00

4.22

0%

45

100%

0.00

0.29

18%

45

100%

4.00

9.96

Table 4.2. Flood Damages
Disrupted
Transport.

Floor or
Wall
Coverings

Furniture

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

29

64%

14

31%

9

20%

4

9%

3

7%

3

7%

3

7%

11

24%

Keepsakes

Contaminated
Water

Appliances

Loss of
Business

No Damage

Flood Related Behavior
The next set of variables focused on behavior. Questions addressed
actions taken to reduce flood damage, reduce vulnerability, and share loss.
The first question dealt with actions taken to secure personal property or
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safety during flood events. Participants were given a card listing some
possible responses and asked to name those they had employed during a
flood event at any time in their life. The percentage of participants naming
each response type is listed in Table 4.3. The number who elevated valuables
reflects the number of respondents who have experienced flooding at their
current residence (see Table 4.1). Similarly, the percentage who have never
responded to an event is comparable to the percent whose current property
has never been flooded.

Table 4.3. Personal Event Response
Elevated Valuables

Evacuated

Personal Sandbagging

Other
(Taped Windows)

No Personal Event
Response

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

16

36%

6

13%

4

9%

1

2%

28

62%

In the next question, participants were asked about community
response activities during a specific event. At the time of the 1998 October
flood, 64 percent of the survey respondents were living in Wimberley. One
person identified himself as part of the 1998 emergency respons e team.
Another identified himself as currently part of the Citizen Emergency
Response Team. Again, individuals were given a list and asked to name any
and all activities in which they participated.
Of participants citing actions other than those listed on the card, one
person helped to process flood insurance claims and provide information in a
professional

capacity.

Others

described

neighborhood

activities.

Neighborhood based activities were the most commonly mentioned, though
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locally organized relief efforts did exist and were publicized in the local paper
(Allen, 1998). An article in the October 28th 1998 Wimberley View indicated
that a scheduled clean up was “sparsely attended” (Bond, 1998). It appears
that community activity was fairly limited to those directly affected, the efforts
of the Wimberley Intercommunity Network notwithstanding. The majority (69
percent) of respondents took no community action. Activities mentioned by
more than one person are included in Table 4.4. Only one person mentioned
making a donation; distribution of food and water was not mentioned by any of
the participants.

Table 4.4. Community Response, 1998 October Floods
Community
Sandbagging
#
%
2

4%

Distribution of
Aid
#
%
2

4%

Community
Cleanup
#
%
3

Neighborhood
Cleanup
#
%

7%

5

11%

Helped Friends
Take Action
#
%
5

11%

No Community
Action
#
%
31

69%

The third question of the behavior set focused on general protective
measures. Each person was asked whether he or she had raised a house
above flood level, raised utilities, or taken other protective measures.
Measures receiving multiple affirmative responses are included in Table 4.5.
Moving a propane tank, modifying a septic system, and moving higher were
each mentioned by one person. Most participants had not taken any
protective measures, though 58 percent lived in either the 100 or 500 year
floodplain (see Table 4.6).

78

Table 4.5. General Protective Measures

Raised House

Raised Utilities

Purposely Bought
or Built outside
Floodplain/
Elevation
Certificate

Checked
Previous Levels
with Neighbors

Created
Diversions

No Protective
Measures
Taken

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

4

9%

6

13%

2

4%

2

4%

5

11%

26

58%

The final question related to mitigation dealt with flood insurance.
Participants were asked whether or not they had insurance, or if they did not
know. Individuals were also asked whether or not they lived in a Special Flood
Hazard Area (SFHA). Respondents were again given the Don’t Know option.
Results are included in Table 4.6.

Table 4.6. Floodplains and Flood In surance
YES

In SFHA

In 500
Year

Not in
Official
Floodplain

DON’T
KNOW

NO

Total

#

%

#

%

#

%

Insurance

6

40%

4

27%

5

33%

Believe
they are
in SFHA

8

53%

0

0%

7

47%

Insurance

5

45%

5

45%

1

9%

Believe
they are
in SFHA

1

9%

8

73%

2

18%

Insurance

3

16%

14

74%

2

11%

Believe
they are
in SFHA

0

0%

12

63%

7

37%

14

31%

23

51%

8

18%

Total Insurance

#

%

15

100%

11

100%

19

100%

45

100%

One third of the participants were previously determined to be living in
an SFHA. Another 24 percent lived in the 500 year floodplain. Of those 26
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people, only 42 percent claimed to have flood insurance. It is likely that those
who answered Don’t Know thought it was included in their home policy or
renter’s insurance. Some who answered Yes may have believed the same;
FEMA claims that, as of December, 2003, only 9 Wimberley policies were in
force. These numbers and the behavioral results of Table 4.5 indicate a
potential failure of flood policy and communication. Those in the floodplain
appear to be dangerously unprepared for another large flood from the
standpoint of policy.
Respondents were also asked to rate their familiarity with the National
Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). No explanation of the program was given.
Familiarity was rated on a four point scale, 1 being very unfamiliar and 4 being
very familiar. Results were not encouraging and are included in Table 4.7.
The lack of familiarity with the program may help to explain the apparent lack
of preparation indicated above. Lave and Lave (1991) cite the poor marketing
of the NFIP as particularly problematic; communication of program goals and
benefits needs to be improved.

Table 4.7. NFIP Familiarity
Very
Unfamiliar
(1)

Somewhat
Unfamiliar
(2)

Somewhat
Familiar
(3)

Very Familiar
(4)

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

25

56%

11

24%

5

11%

4

9%

45

100%
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Total

Mean

1.73

Information Sources
The fourth set of questions in the Personal Flood History concerned
sources of flood information and respondents’ subsequent satisfaction.
Participants were given a card listing a number of possible sources of
information. They were then asked to choose their primary source for
information on local flooding. They were also asked to name their primary
source of information on flood response options. Sources that were not
originall y listed, but garnered multiple votes, are included with the rest in table
4.8. Two people did not name a source in either question, saying they did not
care about flooding and had not looked for information.
In both cases, TV was the most widely preferre d source for information,
with Friends and Family second. These findings reinforce the results of a
study by Anderson (2001) conducted in San Marcos, Texas. It is imperative
that the television media in the area be well informed. Commercials might also
be an effective means of communicating options. When the interviews were
conducted, FEMA had just begun running an informational advertisement
regarding flood insurance; it was mentioned a few times.

Table 4.8. Information Sources
TV

Radio

Paper

Friends
or Family

Local
Gov

Fed or
State Gov

Internet

Common
Sense/
Experience

%
Affirmative

64%

4%

4%

11%

2%

0%

4%

0%

Number
Affirmative

29

2

2

5

1

0

2

0

%
Affirmative

49%

0%

2%

17%

7%

2%

4%

11%

Number
Affirmative

22

0

1

8

3

1

2

5

Info Source

On Local
Flooding

On
Response
Options
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The majority of those who cited local government as their primary
source of information had a relative working in an emergency or planning
related organization. Others exclaimed, “You’ve got to be kidding.” It appears
that many do not directly associate the government with flood information.
What’s more, they might not trust what information they do get. Disdain
seems to run deep; in 2002, a referendum was introduced to disband the
village government (Wimberley Comprehensive Plan, 2002). While it did not
pass, individuals may find the media more accessible and more trustworthy.
Anderson’s work found that only 40 percent of those interviewed recognized
the government as a trustworthy source of information, while 85 percent
considered television to be trustworthy (Anderson, 2001). If this is the case,
the government would be wise to work through the media directly.
Overall satisfaction with available flood information was rated on a five
point scale, 1 being very dissatisfied, 3 being neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
and 5 being very satisfied. Over two thirds (71 percent) of respondents were
either very satisfied or somewhat satisfied with available information. While
some may not know what they are missing (as evidenced by behavior,
insurance, and NFIP familiarity scores), the overall score does indicate trust in
the primary sources mentioned in Table 4.8. These sources should be
utilized. Totals for each level are given in Table 4.9.

82

Table 4.9. Flood Information Satisfaction
Very
Dissatisfied
(1)

Somewhat
Dissatisfied
(2)

Neither
Satisfied nor
Dissatisfied
(3)

Somewhat
Satisfied
(4)

Very
Satisfied
(5)

Total

Mean

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

2

4%

1

2%

10

23%

23

51%

9

20%

45

100%

3.80

Section 2: Comparative Flood Descriptions

Section 2 consisted of five subsections and was the main source of the
data used in analysis. The questions in the first four subsections were very
similar, if not identical, and were designed to illustrate respondents’
perceptions of uncertainty and levels of concern related to flooding.
Comparable data were collected using the four methods of description
outlined in the introduction: the 100 year flood; a flood with a 1 percent
chance of occurring any year; a flood with a 26 percent chance of occurring in
30 years; and an online flood risk map from Project Impact designed by FEMA
and the GIS company ESRI. All descriptions refer to a flood of the same
theoretical size. The results of these subsections were used to evaluate the
relative effectiveness of each term as a means to communicate flood risk. The
fifth subsection makes an attempt to identify other potentially effective
methods of flood communication through the use of both open and closed
questions.
The results of each of the first four subsections are included in Tables
4.10 - 4.21. The first table in each subsection section concerns questions of
uncertainty over time and space. The second deals with expressed need for
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protection of both personal and community interests. The third indicates
expressed levels of concern pertaining to personal and community loss. In the
first two sets, participants were asked to respond to statements using a four
point scale of agreement where 1 equaled Strongly Disagree and 4 equaled
Strongly Agree. A Don’t Know option was also given. The data on concern
levels were gathered using a 6 point scale where 1 equaled Very
Unconcerned and 6 equaled Very Concerned. Don’t Know was not a given
option.

100 Year Flood Results
The first descriptive method used was the 100 year flood. Perception of
uncertainty was assessed in four ways. Participants were first asked to
respond to the statement, “A 100 year flood will not happen again in my
lifetime.” The next statement was, “A 100 year flood could happen one or
more times in any year.” Respondents were then asked the extent to which
they agreed that scientists could accurately assess the size of a 100 year
flood. The last of the uncertainty statements was, “The size of a 100 year
flood will change over time.” Results are listed in Table 4.10. Unless otherwise
noted, uncertainty statements used in the following three subsections simply
substitute the descriptive term.
Perception of protection warranted by the 100 year flood was evaluated
on two levels. Respondents were first asked to what extent they agreed that
they should protect themselves against the 100 year flood. They were also
asked to respond to the statement, “My community should protect itself
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against the 100 year flood.” Results are contained in Table 4.11. Identical
statements of protection agreement were used in each of the following three
subsections. Only the descriptive terms are different.

Table 4.10. 100 Year Uncertainty
Strongly
Disagree
(1)

Somewhat
Disagree
(2)

Somewhat
Agree
(3)

Strongly
Agree
(4)

Don’t Know

Total

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

One or
More in
Year

3

7%

6

13%

17

38%

17

38%

2

4%

45

100%

Not in
Lifetime

23

51%

15

33%

4

9%

1

2%

2

4%

45

100%

Size
Accurate

17

38%

11

24%

10

22%

1

2%

6

13%

45

100%

Size
Change

0

0%

1

2%

17

38%

17

38%

10

22%

45

100%

Table 4.11. 100 Year Protection

Should
Protect
Self
Community
Should
Protect
Itself

Strongly
Disagree
(1)
#
%

Somewhat
Disagree
(2)
#
%

Somewhat
Agree
(3)
#
%

Strongly
Agree (4)

Don’t Know

#

%

#

%

#

%

1

2%

7

16%

17

38%

18

40%

2

4%

45

100%

1

2%

2

4%

15

33%

27

60%

0

0%

45

99%

Total

Like warranted protection, concern levels were also related to both
personal interests and community interests. Participants were asked to rate
their level of concern regarding personal loss due to a 100 year flood. Next,
they were asked about their concern regarding community loss due to a 100
year flood. Results are found in Table 4.12. In the next three subsections, the
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only differences in the questions regarding concern are the terms used to
describe the flood.

Table 4.12. 100 Year Concern Levels
Very
Unconcerned
(1)

Somewhat
Unconcerned
(2)

Slightly
Unconcerned
(3)

Slightly
Concerned
(4)

Somewhat
Concerned
(5)

Very
Concerned
(6)

Total

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

Pers.
Loss

14

31%

4

9%

6

13%

8

18%

7

16%

6

13%

45

100

Comm.
Loss

3

7%

2

4%

2

4%

8

18%

14

31%

16

36%

45

100

1 Percent Chance Results
The second phrase used to describe a flood that policy considers
hazardous was “a flood with a 1 percent chance of occurring in any year.” No
reference flood or explanation was given to the participants. In the first
uncertainty statement read, the timeframe was changed from “lifetime” to
“next year”. Responses to the uncertainty statements are found in Table 4.13.
Protection and concern statements remained the same. Results are listed in
Tables 4.14 and 4.15, respectively. Of particular note is the difference
between the distributions of personal concern and community concern. The
mean for personal concern was 2.96; that of community concern was 4.31.
This appeared to be a consistent trend across the descriptive methods and
will be analyzed more thoroughly in the next chapter.
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Table 4.13. 1% Chance Uncertainty
Strongly
Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

Somewhat
Agree

Strongly
Agree

Don’t Know

Total

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

One or
More in
Year

2

4%

3

7%

12

27%

26

58%

2

4%

45

100%

Not Next
Year

31

69%

7

16%

3

7%

0

0%

4

9%

45

100%

Size
Accurate

18

40%

12

27%

9

20%

0

0%

6

13%

45

100%

Size
Change

1

2%

1

2%

16

36%

16

36%

11

24%

45

100%

Table 4.14. 1% Chance Protection

Should
Protect
Self
Community
Should
Protect
Itself

Strongly
Disagree
#
%

Somewhat
Disagree
#
%

Somewhat
Agree
#
%

Strongly
Agree
#
%

5

11%

7

16%

20

44%

12

3

7%

2

4%

14

31%

26

Don’t Know

Total

#

%

#

%

27%

1

2%

45

100%

58%

0

0%

45

100%

Table 4.15. 1% Chance Concern Levels
Very
Unconcerned
(1)

Somewhat
Unconcerned
(2)

Slightly
Unconcerned
(3)

Slightly
Concerned
(4)

Somewhat
Concerned
(5)

Very
Concerned
(6)

Total

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

Pers.
Loss

16

36%

3

7%

7

16%

8

18%

8

18%

3

7%

45

100

Comm.
Loss

4

9%

2

4%

3

7%

12

27%

15

33%

9

20%

45

100

26 Percent Chance Results
The third method used to communicate flood risk was “a flood with a 26
percent chance of occurring in 30 years.” It should be noted that 64 percent of
the respondents found this method confusing and asked for clarification.
When asked, the interviewer described the flood as having an approximately
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one in four chance of occurring over the course of a standard mortgage. This
technique has been used by the TVA and NRC as a means of explaining the
phrase. All other statements were framed in the same manner as those
concerning the 1 percent chance flood. Results are found in Tables 4.16,
4.17, and 4.18. As in the previous methods, a rather high percentage (in this
case, 24 percent) of respondents answered “Don’t Know” to the question
regarding change over time. This indicates a lack of awareness of the links
between land use and flooding and may warrant a targeted education
campaign. Increased understanding might increase public support for nonstructural mitigation.

Table 4.16. 26% Chance Uncertainty
Strongly
Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

Somewhat
Agree

Strongly
Agree

Don’t Know

Total

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

One or
More in
Year

0

0%

7

16%

17

38%

16

36%

5

11%

45

100

Not Next
Year

23

51%

17

38%

3

7%

0

0%

2

4%

45

100

Size
Accurate

28

62%

9

20%

4

9%

0

0%

4

9%

45

100

Size
Change

1

2%

1

2%

17

38%

15

33%

11

24%

45

100

Table 4.17. 26% Chance Protection
Strongly
Disagree
#
%

Somewhat
Disagree
#
%

Somewhat
Agree
#
%

Strongly
Agree
#
%

Should
Protect
Self

3

7%

5

11%

20

44%

16

Community
Should
Protect
Itself

1

2%

2

4%

16

36%

26
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Don’t Know

Total

#

%

#

%

36%

1

2%

45

100

58%

0

0%

45

100

Table 4.18. 26% Chance Concern Levels
Very
Unconcerned
(1)

Somewhat
Unconcerned
(2)

Slightly
Unconcerned
(3)

Slightly
Concerned
(4)

Somewhat
Concerned
(5)

Very
Concerned
(6)

Total

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

Pers.
Loss

13

29%

5

11%

6

13%

7

16%

8

18%

6

13%

45

100

Comm.
Loss

3

7%

3

7%

5

11%

4

9%

19

42%

11

24%

45

100

Map Results
In the fourth subsection, the communication method was visual. The
maps illustrated the boundaries of the official 100 year and 500 year
floodplains, but the shaded areas were not described in those terms.
Participants were asked only about the depiction of the 100 year floodplain,
and told that the area was considered by flood policy to be of high risk. The
first two uncertainty statements were the same as above. Those regarding
accuracy and change were dropped. Instead, the interviewer indicated a point
on the map (consistent in each surveyed neighborhood) outside the “high risk”
area and asked how much they agreed with the statement, “If I live here, I am
safe from flooding.” This statement addressed map accuracy and the potential
for unrepresented change. Results for the uncertainty statements are given in
Table 4.19. Assessment methods for protection and concern levels did not
change. Results are included in Tables 4.20 and 4.21.
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Table 4.19. Map Uncertainty
Strongly
Disagree
#
%

Somewhat
Disagree
#
%

Somewhat
Agree
#
%

Strongly
Agree
#
%

One or
More in
Year

0

0%

3

7%

20

44%

17

Not Next
Year

31

69%

7

16%

5

11%

Safe
Outside
Shading

14

31%

13

29%

12

27%

Don’t Know

Total

#

%

#

%

38%

5

11%

45

100

0

0%

2

4%

45

100

4

9%

2

4%

45

100

Table 20. Map Protection
Strongly
Disagree
Should
Protect
Self
Community
Should
Protect
Itself

Somewhat
Disagree

Somewhat
Agree

Strongly
Agree

Don’t Know

Total

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

6

13%

4

9%

17

38%

16

36%

2

4%

45

100

2

4%

3

7%

9

20%

30

67%

1

2%

45

100

Table 21. Map Concern Levels
Very
Unconcerned
(1)

Somewhat
Unconcerned
(2)

Slightly
Unconcerned
(3)

Slightly
Concerned
(4)

Somewhat
Concerned
(5)

Very
Concerned
(6)

Total

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

Pers.
Loss

13

29%

4

9%

5

11%

10

22%

5

11%

8

18%

45

100

Comm.
Loss

2

4%

3

7%

2

4%

5

11%

15

33%

18

40%

45

100

Section 3: Demographics

The questions of Section 3 were used to collect general demographic
information, including gender, race, education levels, income, and age.
Participants were also asked for the number of years they had lived at both
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their current address and in Wimberley. Gender, race, and education levels
were assessed using nominal scales. Respondents were asked to indicate
their income using an ordinal scale. Information on age and years of
residency were gathered using open ended questions.
Of the 45 participants, 23 (51%) were women. This is slightly lower
than the 2000 Wimberley CDP Census figure of 54 percent for females over
18. All but two individuals, or 96% of the sample, indicated their race as
“white, non-Latino”. The remaining 4% described themselves as “Latino”.
Census 2000 percentages were 91 percent white and 7 percent Latino. The
Census Bureau also reported that the median adult age for the population
was 45.6 years in 2000; the sample median was 52 years. The youngest
participant was 19 years old and the oldest was 83. On average, respondents
had lived at their current address for 7.96 years, though the minimum was
only 0.08 years and the maximum was 30 years. The mean number of years
spent in Wimberley was 11.95, with a minimum of 0.08 years and a maximum
of 83 years. Medians for both residency variables were lower than the means
at 6 years and 9 years, respectively.
The breakdown of education and income levels are included in Tables
4.22 and 4.23. Education categories refer to highest degree or level of
education the individual achieved. One individual declined to answer. The
income level represents the estimated range of the respondent’s annual
household income in 2003. Seven people did not want their income level
recorded.
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Table 4.22. Education Levels
High
School
Diploma
or GED

Some
College

#

%

#

%

#

8

18%

10

22%

2

Associate’s
Degree

Bachelor’s
Degree

Master’s
Degree

Professional
Degree

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

4%

17

38%

6

13%

0

0%

1

2%

1

2%

45

100

PhD

No Data

Total

Table 4.23. Income Levels
Under
$20,000

$20,00135,000

$35,001 –
50,000

$50,001 –
75,000

$75,000 –
100,000

Over
$100,000

No Data

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

5

11%

12

27%

5

11%

5

11%

4

9%

7

16%

7

16%

45

100

Total

According to the Census Bureau, 41.2 percent of Wimberley’s
population held a Bachelor’s degree or higher in 2000. Of those interviewed,
24, or 53 percent, held the same. When comparing only the percentage of
those holding Bachelor’s degrees, the sample was approximately 14 points
higher than the Census data. Percentages were similar in all other listed
categories. However, none of the respondents had less than a high school
diploma or the equivalent, while in the overall population, the Census Bureau
estimated the rate to be close to 11 percent. Median income for the
Wimberley Designated Census Area was $46,042 in 2000. Median income for
the sample was between $35,001 and $50,000. This includes the Cens us
median, though the distributions were not equal. Survey participants were
slightly better educated and slightly older than Wimberley’s general
population, but overall, the sample approximates the intended population fairly
well.
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Identifying Alternatives

Included in Sections 1 and 2 of the survey were questions intended to
identify potentially effective (in terms of both understanding and persuasion)
methods of flood communication. The results from three sets of questions are
presented here.

Specific Flood Levels and Relative Concern
In the first set, descriptions of flood size were given in terms of height
relative to residence. Participants were read a series of flood heights ranging
from the yard to over one foot in the home and asked to indicate the level of
concern associated with each. It should be noted that most residences in
Wimberley do not have basements. Respondents used the same concern
scale used in the previous subsections. Results are included in Table 4.24.

Table 4.24. Residential Flooding and Concern
Very
Unconcerned
(1)

Somewhat
Unconcerned
(2)

Slightly
Unconcerned
(3)

Slightly
Concerned
(4)

Somewhat
Concerned
(5)

Very
Concerned
(6)

Total

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

Yard

4

9%

2

4%

1

2%

8

18%

14

31%

16

36%

45

100

Outer
Walls

2

4%

1

2%

1

2%

3

7%

11

24%

27

60%

45

100

Up to 6
Inches

2

4%

0

0%

0

0%

1

2%

4

9%

38

84%

45

100

6
Inches
to 1
Foot

1

2%

0

0%

1

2%

0

0%

1

2%

42

93%

45

100

Over 1
Foot

1

2%

0

0%

1

2%

0

0%

1

2%

42

93%

45

100
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There appear to be two breaking points in the levels of concern
associated with specific relative heights. The first is the point where water
contacts the outside walls of the residence. The number of people answering
Very Concerned jumped 24 percentage points. An identical increase was
observed when the theoretical flood waters moved inside the residence.
These points could potentially be used in flood risk communication to make
the threat more concrete.

Methods of Describing Flood Size
In the Personal Flood History section of the questionnaire, respondents
were asked to identify the size of the 1998 flood using their own words. Their
answers were then coded by type of description. Seven types of description
were used by more than one person, including return period, qualitative
comparison to other floods, flood stage in feet, reference to some point on an
individual’s property, the estimated number of homes flooded in the
community, discharge in cubic feet per second, and Don’t Know. These
categories and the number of people that used each are found in Table 4.25.
Numerical answers within the categories varied greatly and are
included where applicable. One person used a community landmark and
another used rainfall to describe size. One person used two methods to
describe the flood. Twenty-nine people (64 percent) identified themselves as
living in Wimberley during the time of the 1998 flood. Those who did not were
not asked to describe the size of the flood, though three mentioned it. Their
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answers are noted in the table. Most others who did not live in Wimberley
during the 1998 flood mentioned in passing that they did not know its size.

Table 4.25. Methods of Size Identification
Return
Period

Relative to
Other
Floods

Stage

Home
Reference

# of Homes
Lost

Don’t Know/
No Data

CFS

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

98
Residents

7

16%

5

11%

4

9%

3

7%

3

7%

1

2%

5

11%

1998 NonRes

0

0%

2

4%

0

0%

0

0%

0

0%

1

2%

13

29%

Descriptive
Range

100 to 500
Year

2nd to 1s t
Largest

25’ to 40’

NA

1 to 50

28,000 to
300,000 cfs

NA

Not surprisingly, return period was one of the two most frequently used
methods to describe the flood. It is the method most commonly used by both
the media and officials in communication. Seven people also described the
flood in terms of its size relative to other floods. This may be somewhat
useful, but depends on a single collective memory that newcomers do not
have access to, and that may differ among the experienced. Flood stage was
the third most frequently used method, and may not be currently utilized to its
full potential.

Aspects of Flooding and Concern
In the third question presented in this section, participants were asked
to identify the aspect of flooding of most concern to them. Four choices were
given, including Level, Frequency, a Combination of Level and Frequency,
and Other. Of the four people who picked Other, three stated that they were
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not concerned about anything. One cited speed. The results are included in
Table 4.26.

Table 4.26. Most Concerning Aspect of Flooding
Level

Frequency

Combination

Other

Total

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

22

49%

0

0%

19

42%

4

9%

45

100%

Approximately half (49 percent) of the people interviewed identified
flood level as the most concerning aspect of flooding. Another 42 percent
cited a combination of level and frequency. None chose frequency alone. This
is a problem. The term most frequently used to describe floods, like the terms
introduced to replace it, is wholly focused on frequency. Flood risk
communication cannot hope to be effective if it does not address the concerns
of those it is intended to reach. The same can be said of flood policy.
Frequency methods might be effective if linked to specific heights or
damages, as was suggested by the NRC (2000). Used alone, their
effectiveness is questionable. A flood stage linked to specific physic al markers
may be more effective than current methods in communicating flood risk and
inducing appropriate pre-event attitude and behavior. Agreed upon flood
levels might also be more useful in creating and enforcing flood policy.
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Summary

The data presented in this Chapter provide foundation and direction for
further analysis. The sample was shown to represent the intended population
moderately well. Those interviewed had a broad range of experience and
familiarity with flooding and flood programs. Attitudes toward flooding and
flood protection also differed, though responses appeared to be more closely
grouped than expected. The final section showed that individuals describe
floods in a variety of ways and that current methods of flood risk description
may not address public concerns. This issue, like the research questions and
hypotheses outlined in Chapter One, requires more in depth analysis and will
be examined more thoroughly in the following Chapter.
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Chapter Five: Analysis and Discussion

Introduction

This project attempted to answer four questions within the context of
the case study area.
5. What is the public perception of the hundred year flood in
terms of probability and risk?
6. Is “hundred year flood”
communicating flood risk?

terminology

effective

in

7. Is the visual representation of the hundred year flood
effective in communicating flood risk?
8. Are the terms introduced as replacements for or
augmentations of “the hundred year flood” more effective in
communicatin g flood risk?
The descriptive statistics of the last chapter provided foundation and direction,
but substantive answers require more in depth analysis.
In Chapter One, hypotheses were put forth concerning the relative
effectiveness of four methods used to describe flood risk. Hypotheses
regarding the relationships of certain situational and cognitive factors to
aspects of perception were also developed. In addition to assessing the
validity of the hypotheses, this chapter looks at the relationships between
situational and cognitive factors and the protective behavior exhibited by
those living in the floodplain.
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Several statistical techniques were used to test hypotheses and
examine the data. Comparisons of effectiveness were made using paired ttests for those variables with a relatively normal distribution. Friedman and
Wilcoxon sign-rank tests were used to compare variables with skewed
distributions. Relationships between situational and cognitive factors and
aspects of perception were assessed using Pearson’s correlation coefficient,
cross tabulation, and independent t-tests. In order to increase the validity of
the survey results, related variables were combined to form scales; scale
validity and reliability were tested using factor analysis and Cronbach’s alpha.
Specific analyses are explained as they are used.

Comparing Relative Effectiveness

As described in previous chapters, the bulk of the survey was made up
of four subsections containing questions intended to measure effectiveness.
Each subsection used a different method to describe the same theoretical
flood event. Verbal methods included the 100 year flood, a flood with a 1
percent chance of happening in any year, and a flood with a 26 percent
chance of occurring in 30 years. Floods were described visually through a
flood risk map available online through FEMA’s Project Impact. Only two
people mentioned the equality of the 100 year and 1 percent chance events.
None equated the 26 percent chance event with a flood described by other
means.
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Chapter One outlined two methods used to assess the effectiveness of
communication: understanding and persuasion. In this project, understanding
focused on uncertainty concepts associated with flood descriptions. Four
questions in each subsection dealt with environmental or human uncertainty.
Persuasion was also handled with four questions and was split to reflect
levels of concern and the perceived need for protection relative to each
description. These questions were combined to form scales of uncertainty,
protection, concern, and overall persuasion (a combination of protection and
concern).

Scale Creation
Individual questions provide insight into perception, but the larger
concepts of uncertainty and risk are more pertinent in the comparison of
effectiveness. The data regarding the 100 year flood were used to test the
validity and reliability of the new scales. The 100 year flood is the most
commonly used method of flood description and respondents answered this
subset of questions with more confidence, leaving fewer missing values.
Answers of Don’t Know were treated as missing values in factor analysis and
reliability testing. Factor analysis confirmed the usefulness of grouping the
eight questions into the categories of uncertainty, protection, and concern
described above and detailed in the previous chapter.
Before testing for reliability using Cronbach’s alpha, the negative
questions were recoded to reflect a single directional scale. The question
regarding the ability of scientists to accurately assess the size of a theoretical
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flood event was dropped from the final uncertainty scale. In the factor
analysis, it had the lowest inter-item correlation of all the uncertainty variables
as well as the lowest loading score. Factor results for the uncertainty scale
are found in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1. Uncertainty Variable Correlations and Factor Loading for
Uncertainty Scale
Correlations
Variables
Anytime

Not Again

Accurate

Uncertainty
Loading

Anytime

1.000

.6320

.4067

.8912

Not Again

.6320

1.000

.2740

.7537

Accurate*

.4067

.2740

1.000

.5204

Will Change

.5239

.3008

.08510

.7147

Anytime = Event might happen one or more times in a year
Not Again = Event will not happen again in lifetime
Will Change = Size of the event will change over time
Accurate = Scientists can accurately assess the size of the event
*Variable not included in final scale

The adjusted scale contained fewer missing values and the alpha score
increased slightly. In addition, the accuracy question had more to do with
human error and the uncertainties of science than environmental uncertainty,
bringing in issues of trust. This question is useful in exploring perception, but
less useful in assessing an understanding of uncertainty. No variables were
dropped from the persuasiveness scales.
Cronbach’s alpha is essentially a correlation measure and ranges from
0 to 1. Values close to one indicate that the scale produces consistent results
and that each item has a strong relationship to the others in the scale.
Rodeghier (1996) and Litwin (2003) set the guidelines for reliability at alpha
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equals approximately 0.70, though Rodeghier indicates that, “this rule of
thumb is approximate and should not be routinely applied” (Rodeghier, 1996).
Because of the limited number of variables in all the scales and the skewness
of the protection scale, alpha was not expected to be extremely high.
Cronbach’s alpha for the uncertainty and protection scales were 0.69 and
0.68, respectively. Each scale can be said to be relatively reliable.

Table 5.2. Cronbach’s Alpha for 100 Year Uncertainty, Protection,
Persuasion, and Concern Scales
Cronbach’s Alpha

Valid Cases*

Uncertainty Scale

0.69

33

Protection Scale

0.68

43

Concern Scale

0.46

45

Persuasion Scale

0.55

43

*Don’t Knows eliminated

Cronbach’s alpha for the concern scale was only 0.46. Condensing the
response categories did not improve the score. Other descriptive methods
had higher reliability ratings for the concern scale. The low alpha could be a
result of both the limited number of variables and the large difference between
personal concern and concern for the community, which will be discussed in a
subsequent section. The alpha of the overall persuasion scale was also
affected by this split. When concern variables for each descriptive method
were used in an overall scale of concern, Cronbach’s alpha was 0.89. A
combined persuasion scale resulted in an alpha of 0.91. It is useful to the
analysis to include and compare the subsets.
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Creation and Evaluation of Uncertainty and Persuasion Variables
In order to compare the effectiveness of the four methods of
description, new variables were formed based on the tested scales. The
values of individual variables were added together to create the new scores.
The uncertainty scale consisted of three variables with original value ranges
of 1 through 4. (Refer to the second section of Chapter Four and Tables 4.10,
4.13, 4.16, and 4.19 for specifics. The accuracy value was dropped and
values for “Next” were reversed for consistency. New values lay between 3
and 12. Protection values were also based on a four point scale (see Tables
4.11, 4.14, 4.17, and 4.20) and new values ranged from 2 to 8. Concern
variables were based on a six point scale (see Tables 4.12, 4.15, 4.18, 4.21);
the new range was from 2 through 12. In each case, the higher the score, the
more effective the communication was judged to be from the standpoint of
policy.
U.S. flood policy has been based on an event described as the 100
year flood. Policy considers this event to be high risk to both individuals and
communities, but does the public view it as such? New terms have been
introduced to increase public understanding of uncertainty, but do these terms
induce the desired level of concern and protection? In this study, methods of
communication were judged to be effective if the observed mean is at least 85
percent of the total possible points. This percentage would indicate that, on
average, individuals answered at least one question of each scale in strong
agreement with policy and no questions in opposition to policy or with “Don’t
Know”.
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As discussed below, there were no significant differences found
between the various descriptive methods regarding the number of Don’t Know
answers. Because of this, Don’t Know answers were treated as missing
values in direct comparisons. However, when judging the overall effectiveness
of a method in contributing to the understanding of uncertainty or in shaping
attitudes, Don’t Know is not a neutral answer. It indicates that the coding used
may not be recognizable. This is especially evident when looking at
effectiveness in terms of understanding. When evaluating effectiveness as a
percentage of a scale’s total possible points, Don’t Know answers were
assigned a value of zero and included in the calculation of the mean.
Hypotheses concerning effectiveness and expected relative scores are
outlined in Table 5.3.

Table 5.3. Hypotheses of Effectiveness and Expected Relative Scores
Expected Relative Scores
Descriptive Method

Hypotheses

100 Year Flood

Uncertainty

Persuasion

Perceived to Be Regular
and Predictable; Moderate
Risk

Low

Moderate

1% Chance Flood

Perceived to be Random;
Low Risk

High

Low

26% Chance Flood

Perceived to Somewhat
Regular, but
Unpredictable; Moderate
Risk

Moderate

Moderate

Map

Boundaries Absolute, but
Timing Somewhat
Unpredictable

Moderate to Low,
Depending on Location

Moderate to Low,
Depending on Location
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Comparing Perceptions of Uncertainty
All four uncertainty variables had a fairly normal distribution. Because
hypotheses had been mad e regarding the relative effectiveness of each term,
comparisons were made using one-tailed paired t-tests with an alpha of 0.05.
Each uncertainty variable was compared to the other three. Table 5.4 includes
the differences in paired means, the level of significance of that difference, the
actual mean of each variable when Don’t Knows are treated as zeroes, and
the 95 percent confidence interval for the mean as a percentage of total points
possible. Cell values and signs indicate the difference between the means of
variables in the first column and those in columns two, three, and four. Tables
should be read horizontally.

Table 5.4. Comparisons of Uncertainty Variables

100 Year
Comparison

1% Comparison

26% Comparison

Dif.

Sig.

Dif.

Sig.

Dif.

Sig.

100 Year
Uncertainty

NA

NA

-.53*

.040

.03

.45

1% Uncertainty

.53

.04

NA

NA

.52

26% Uncertainty

-.03

.45

-.52

.00

Map Uncertainty

0.00

.50

-.62

.01

Mean
(Don’t
Knows
Treated as
Zeroes)**

95% Confidence
Interval
(Mean as
Percentage
of Total Points)

Low

High

8.91

67.4%

81.1%

.00

9.20

69.8%

83.5%

NA

NA

8.71

66.2%

79.0%

-.22

.23

9.16

70.2%

82.4%

* Negative signs indicate that the variable in the corresponding row has a lower mean than the associated column
variable. Values indicate the magnitude of the difference.
**Total possible points equals 12
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As hypothesized, the 1 percent method of description has the highest
overall mean score, but the map comes very close and has the smallest
standard deviation when including Don’t Knows as zeroes. None of the 95
percent confidence intervals include values totaling 85 percent of the total
points possible. However, only the 26 percent method’s confidence interval
lies entirely below 80 percent of the total points; it is also the only method
whose median is 9 rather than 10.
While none are categorically effective, no method can be dismissed as
completely ineffective in conveying uncertainty. The higher than expected
mean value given the 100 year flood may have quite a bit to do with its
familiarity in a developing, flood prone area. Mental adjustments may have
been made by turning ‘100 year’ events into regular episodes of a different
period. Experience may similarly impact the map score, as many individuals
had a concrete idea of past flood parameters and neighborhood topography.
The influence of experience and other situational factors on perception will be
examined in subsequent sections.
In direct comparisons using paired t-tests, uncertainty scores
associated with the 1 percent flood were significantly higher than those of all
three of the other descriptive methods. Though the map was suspected to
have the lowest comparative uncertainty score, no significant differences were
found between the map, the 100 year, or the 26 percent methods.
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Comparing Perceptions of Accuracy
The 26% results should be treated carefully. The accuracy question
was removed from the uncertainty scale, but best illustrates a qualitative trend
observed during the interviews. Participants were uncomfortable with the
apparent exactness of both the percentage and the timeframe in the 26%
chance in 30 years description. When asked whether they agreed that
scientists could accurately assess the size of a flood described in this manner,
more than one participant exclaimed, after a derisive snicker, “Who do they
think they are, God?”. Reactions were immediate and often forceful and
appeared to be directly related to the terms used. None of the other methods
of description elicited such a strong response. Quantitative analysis confirmed
the trend.

Table 5.5. Comparisons of Perceived Accuracy

100 Year
Comparison

1% Comparison

26% Comparison

Dif.

Sig.

Dif.

Sig.

Dif.

Sig.

100 Year
Accuracy

NA

NA

.08

.13

.47

.00

1% Accuracy

-.08

.13

NA

NA

.38

26% Accuracy

-.47*

.00

-.39

.00

Map Accuracy

.27

.08

.29

.07

Individual
Mean**

95% Confidence
Interval
( Mean as
Percentage
of Total Points)
Low

High

1.87

39.6%

54.0%

.00

1.77

37.7%

50.8%

NA

NA

1.42

30.1%

40.7%

.70

.00

2.14

45.9%

61.1%

* Negative signs indicate that the variable in the corresponding row has a lower mean than the associated column
variable. Values indicate the magnitude of the difference.
**Total possible points equals 4

107

Comparisons were again made through a one-tailed t-test at alpha =
0.05. Neither the variable nor the scale were modified from the original, so the
scale ranges from 1 = strongly disagree to 4 = strongly agree. No significant
differences were found between the other methods, though the map had the
highest overall score and its highest p -value was 0.08. The difference in mean
score was up to 5 times as great as the differences between other scores.
Differences were all significant at

0.00.

The extreme shift in attitude is

illustrated in Figures 5.1 and 5.2.

Figure 5.1. Histogram of Map Accuracy Ratings

1=Strongly Disagree, 4=Strongly Agree
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Figure 5.2. Histogram of 26% Chance Accuracy Ratings

1=Strongly Disagree, 4=Strongly Agree

While a healthy skepticism of science and probability is useful and
indicates a better understanding of uncertainty, its total dismissal is
detrimental to both persuasion and understanding. The agreement scores are
all low, but the strength of the disagreement associated with 26% terminology
and accuracy makes other data gathered using the term suspect. This
judgment is reinforc ed by the confusion score (64 percent asked for
clarification) discussed in the last chapter.
During the interviews, it also appeared that the probability terms (1
percent and 26 percent chance) were garnering more answers of “Don’t
Know” than the map or the 100 year flood description. This was most
apparent in the uncertainty section of the survey. Don’t Know content was
also statistically tested; a method with a comparatively high number of Don’t
Knows could be considered somewhat ineffective, regardless of other test
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results. It may indicate a potential coding problem in addition to a
comprehension problem.
New variables were created by converting all Don’t Know values to 1
and all others to 0. Don’t Know values for each descriptive method were
combined, then compared. The map had the fewest Don’t Know responses
and the lowest score, which in this case is a positive thing. When compared to
both the 1 percent method and the 26 percent method, the resulting p-value
was 0.055. No other differences were significant at alpha equals 0.05 or 0.10.
While this could be considered a boost for the case of the map, there was
more of a relationship between individual questions and answers of Don’t
Know. Out of 65 total Don’t Knows, 50 occurred in the questions about
accuracy and change. These concepts of uncertainty, particularly that of
change over time, should perhaps be targeted through education.

Comparing Attitudes Toward Protection
The protection variables as a whole did not clearly demonstrate either a
normal or skewed distribution; all were generally concentrated around high
values, but differed in the patterns of their lower values. Because of the
ambiguity of the variables’ distributions as a whole, both non parametric tests
and t-tests were used to detect te nds. Possible values ranged from 2 to 8,
with higher values more desirable from the perspective of policy.
Initially, a Friedman test was used. Differences were not found to be
significant at alpha equals 0.05, though the p-value was 0.071. Wilcoxon tests
found significant differences in protection scores between the 1 percent
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method and the 100 year flood (1 percent lower, p = 0.02) and 1 percent and
26 percent (1 percent lower, p = 0.02). The 1 percent score was lower than
the map score at a significance of 0.07. No other differences were significant.
The results of the non parametric tests were reinforced through the results of
the paired t- tests, included in Table 5.6. Means and confidence intervals are
also listed.

Table 5.6. Comparison of Protection Variables

100 Year
Comparison

1% Comparison

26% Comparison

Dif.

Sig.

Dif.

Sig.

Dif.

Sig.

100 Year
Protection

NA

NA

.49

.01

.12

.26

1% Protection

-.49*

.01

NA

NA

-.34

26% Protection

-.12

.26

.34

.02

NA

Map Protection

-.26

.13

.28

.11

.07

Individual
Mean
(Don’t
Knows
Treated as
Zeroes)**

95% Confidence
Interval
( Mean as
Percentage
of Total Points)
Low

High

6.58

76.6%

87.9%

.02

6.22

71.7%

83.9%

NA

6.53

76.4%

87.0%

.37

6.31

71.6%

86.2%

* Negative signs indicate that the variable in the corresponding row has a lower mean than the associated column
variable. Values indicate the magnitude of the difference.
**Total possible points equals 8

The combination of results may help confirm that the 1 percent
description is less effective than the other terms in inducing protective
behavior or appropriate levels of concern, as was hypothesized. This method
was the only one whose confidence interval did not include the 85 percent
mark. It was close, however, and both the median and the mode were 7. The
mode for the 26 percent method was only 6. Though the 1 percent method
appears relatively less effective, the results are inconclusive. The expressed
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desire to protect oneself and community against flooding may not be related
to the terms used to describe risk.

Comparing Concern
Concern variables showed a normal distribution, so the one-tailed
paired t-test was used with an alpha of 0.05. Results are included in Table
5.7. Cell signs and values again refer to the variables in the first column.

Table 5.7. Comparisons of Concern Variables

100 Year
Comparison

1% Comparison

26% Comparison

Dif.

Sig.

Dif.

Sig.

Dif.

Sig.

100 Year
Concern

NA

NA

.60

.03

.18

.23

1% Concern

-.60*

.03

NA

NA

-.42

26% Concern

-.18

.23

.42

.06

Map Concern

.27

.16

.87

.00

Individual
Mean
(No Don’t
Knows
Recorded)**

95% Confidence
Interval
( Mean as
Percentage
of Total Points)
Low

High

7.87

58.9%

72.2%

.06

7.27

54.2%

67.0%

NA

NA

7.69

57.0%

71.1%

.44

.02

8.13

60.8%

74.7%

* Negative signs indicate that the variable in the corresponding row has a lower mean than the associated column
variable. Values indicate the magnitude of the difference.
**Total possible points equals 12

Though the map was significantly more effective than either of the
probabilities, it was not shown to be better than the 100 year flood in raising
concern. This may again be attributable to public familiarity with 100 year
flood terminology and the aforementioned confusion caused by probabilities.
Maps may serve as an effective jolt to those on the fringes of the Special
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Flood Hazard Area who have not sought out a lot of information and have not
been required to get insurance. Several respondents (especially those near
the 100 year flood plain) remarked that they did not realize they were so close
to danger. None of the percentage ranges are encouraging, however, and the
1 percent description is shown to be the least effective in motivating attitude.
Its paired mean concern score was significantly lower than those of both the
map and the 100 year flood and only slightly above significant in relation to
the 26 percent description.

Comparing Persuasion
As an overall measure of persuasion, a scale including the two
protection variables (personal and community) and the two measures of
concern (also personal and community) was found to have a Cronbach’s
alpha of greater than .67 for three out of the four methods of description. The
highest was 0.73, the lowest 0.55, with an average of 0.66. Based on these
numbers, the scale was judged to be fairly reliable and was used to compare
the overall effectiveness of each method, as judged by persuasion.
The original protection variables were based on a four point scale;
concern variables ranged from one to six. In order to give protection and
concern equal weighting in the new scale, protection scores were multiplied
by 1.5 before combination. Overall persuasion scores ranged from 6 to 24.
Distribution was normal and comparisons were made using one-tailed paired
t-tests at alpha = 0.05. Results are included in Table 5.8 .
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Table 5.8. Comparisons of Overall Persuasion Scores

100 Year
Comparison

1% Comparison

26% Comparison

Dif.

Sig.

Dif.

Sig.

Dif.

Sig.

100 Year
Persuasion

NA

NA

1.36

.01

.24

.27

1% Persuasion

-1.36*

.01

NA

NA

-.99

26% Persuasion

-.24

.27

.99

.01

Map Persuasion

-.15

.37

1.37

.01

Individual
Mean
(Don’t Know
Treated as
Zeroes)**

95% Confidence
Interval
( Mean as
Percentage
of Total Points)
Low

High

17.73

69.1%

78.6%

.01

16.60

63.7%

74.6%

NA

NA

17.49

67.5%

78.3%

.27

.26

17.60

67.2%

79.5%

* Negative signs indicate that the variable in the corresponding row has a lower mean than the associated column
variable. Values indicate the magnitude of the difference.
**Total possible points equals 24

Persuasion scores for the 1 percent method were found to be
significantly lower than each of the other three. The null hypothesis of equality
could not be rejected in the remaining comparisons. Overall scores are
moderate, but the 100 year description, 26 percent chance method, and map
can be said to be equa lly effective in this context. However, the 26 percent
chance results should be eyed warily in light of the issues mentioned above.

Comparing Overall Scores
Comparisons of the descriptive methods’ overall scores were not found
to be useful. Scales including all uncertainty and persuasion variables had
Cronbach’s alphas ranging from 0.42 for the 100 year to 0.66 for the map.
These scores indicate that an overall scale is not reliable and may point to a
problem in linking understanding and persuasion. T-tes ts showed no
significant differences between the methods of description. Those that had
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relatively high scores in uncertainty had low scores in persuasion, and vice
versa. This appears to be a fundamental problem in communicating flood
risk. Managers and policy makers may have to decide whether understanding
or persuasion is most important.

Comparing Attitudes Towards Individuals and Community

Another trend identified qualitatively during the interviews was the
disparity

between

expressed

attitudes

towards

personal

loss

and

responsibility and community loss and responsibility. In order to address this
issue quantitatively, all four descriptive scores for personal protection were
combined. Scores were also combined for personal concern, community
protec tion, and community concern variables. Cronbach scores were all over
0.81, with a high of 0.94. Each new scale can be said to be reliable.
Both community scores were somewhat skewed, but personal scores
had a normal distribution. Comparisons were made using one-tailed t-tests at
alpha = 0.05. The range of possible protection scores was from 4 to 16.
Concern scores ranged from 4 to 24. Results are included in Tables 5.9 and
5.10.

Table 5.9. Comparison of Personal and Community Protection Variables
Mean
(Total Points
Equals 16)

Personal Protection

95% Confidence Interval (Mean
as a Percentage
of Total Points)

Dif.

Sig.

Low

High

Personal Protection

NA

NA

12.17

69.9%

82.2%

Community Protection

1.74

.00

13.93

82.3%

91.8%
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Table 5.10. Comparison of Personal and Community Concern
Mean
(Total Points
Equals 24)

Personal Concern
Dif.

Sig.

Personal Concern

NA

NA

Community Concern

5.62

.00

95% Confidence Interval (Mean
as a Percentage
of Total Points)
Low

High

12.67

44.5%

61.0%

18.29

69.5%

82.9%

In both cases, community means were significantly higher than
personal means. Part of the difference can be attributed to the responses of
people with limited flood experience living in areas of minimal risk. But even
those in areas considered at high risk for flooding tended to worry about their
neighbors more than themselves. This might indicate another possible tack for
emergency managers and planners. A focus on community impacts and
benefits might create the concern and support necessary for non structural
mitigation projects. However, it might also represent a transference of
perceived responsibility the individual to the community, or, as was explained
in Chapter One, a dissonant perception of personal risk.
The attitudes expressed may not translate into community action or
support for community protection projects. Survey results concerning activities
during severe flooding showed that, while neighborhood activities were
somewhat common in affected areas, city-wide participation was minimal (see
Table 4.4). Likewise, though protection scores were relatively high, actions
taken to protect personal property by those considered at risk (100 and 500
year flood plain) were not widespread (see Tables 4.5 and 4.6). Only 11 out of
the 26 individuals considered at risk claimed to have insurance. Only 5 of the
15 in the 100 year floodplain have taken other mitigative measures. The
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disparity between community and personal scores may also cause friction
when community projects require what might be considered unnecessary
personal adjustment.

Comparing Specific and Abstract Descriptions

In addition to rating their levels of personal and community concern in
response to abstract descriptions of risk, participants were also asked to
respond to specific descriptions. Flood levels were given relative to
individuals’ residences and ranged from the “yard” to “over 1 foot” in the
house (see Table 4.24). Only personal concern was evaluated.
During the interviews, participants appeared more involved and
concern scores seemed higher when discussing specifics. Personal concern
scores for each of the abstract descriptions and for the lowest specific level
given (yard) are included in Table 5.11. One-tailed paired t-tests were used to
compare the means and detect significant differences. Results are found in
Table 5.12. Because the abstract methods refer to a flood inundating the
SFHA, only those living in the Special Flood Hazard Area were used in the
comparison.

Table 5.11. Specific and Abstract Levels of Concern*

Mean Personal
Concern

Yard

100 Year

1% Chance

26% Chance

Map

4.53

3.87

2.67

3.60

3.80

*Total possible points equals 6
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Table 5.12. Comparisons of Personal Concern *
100 Year

Yard

1% Chance

26% Chance

Map

Diff.

Sig.

Diff.

Sig.

Diff.

Sig.

Diff.

Sig.

.67

.10

1.87

.01

.93

.03

.73

.05

*Total possible points equals 6

The mean level of concern was shown to be higher for the specific
reference than for any of the other methods of flood description. Differences
between the yard score and the 1 percent chance, the 26 percent chance,
and the map were significant at alpha = 0.05. Only the difference between the
100 year method and the yard was not. These results reinforce the potential
usefulness of concrete reference points in communication. It might be that
specific re ferences are more effective in motivating desired attitude and
behavior than abstract descriptions of flood risk.

Testing Hypotheses of Perception

In addition to comparing the effectiveness of various methods of
communicating flood risk, this project sought to examine the effects of some
situational factors on perception. It was hypothesized that the understanding
of uncertainty increased with education and flood experience. It was expected
that perceived risk (illustrated through persuasion variables) would increase
with age and would be higher for women than for men. Lastly, it was expected
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that those living in the floodplain would have higher uncertainty and
persuasion scores than those who do not.
The first three hypotheses were tested using Pearson’s product
moment to detect positive correlations. Education

data

were

collected

nominally, but were treated as a progressive 8 point scale in this test, 1 being
the completion of 12th grade or lower without receiving a high school diploma
or the equivalent, and 8 being the completion of a Ph.D. Experience was
assessed through both frequency and impact. The frequency scale combined
the number of times the individual’s current property has flooded with the
number of times in their lifetime their property has flooded. This scale was
found to be reliable and had a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.69. Flooding of
businesses and the community were not shown to be reliable measures. The
damage scale was limited to positive responses concerning damage to
structures, floor or wall coverings, appliances, furniture, or keepsakes, and
contaminated drinking water. Cronbach’s alpha was 0.73 for this scale,
showing it to be reliable as well. The original data on age was not altered.
Don’t Knows were treated as zeroes in correlation assessments in
order to retain the number of cases and to make sure those who might
answer Don’t Know most frequently were not left out. Including the Don’t
Knows may assist in targeting education and improving communication.
Correlation coefficients for these situational factors and uncertainty and
persuasion scores are found in Table 5.13. Combined uncertainty, protection,
concern, and persuasion scales were all found to be reliable.
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Table 5.13. Correlations with Uncertainty and Persuasion Scores
Uncertainty

Protection

Concern

Persuasion

Corr.

Sig.

Corr.

Sig.

Corr.

Sig.

Corr.

Sig.

Education

.32

.02

-.057

.36

-.24

.06

-.12

.22

Experience
(Frequency)

-.04

.39

-.16

.15

-.14

.19

-.17

.13

Experience
(Damage)

.16

.14

.03

.43

.14

.18

.10

.25

Age

-.17

.13

-.23

.07

-.14

.17

-.21

.08

Tests showed that only one of the hypothesized relationships existed in
this sample. Education was shown to have a moderate positive correlation
with the understanding of uncertainty concepts. However, a slight negative
correlation between education and levels of concern was found to be just less
than significant at alpha = 0.05. This may have to do with education’s relation
to income and an increased ability to take action.
The final two hypotheses were tested using independent one-tailed ttests with an alpha of 0.05. Gender comparisons used “female” as the primary
variable. Results are found in Table 5.14. Gender differences were significant
in both levels of concern and overall persuasion scores (a combination of
protection and concern). This result confirms the hypothesis that perceived
risk is higher in women than men. Significant differences were also found
between male and female uncertainty scores. Females in this sample had a
lower understanding of uncertainty than did the males. This may be due to the
difference in education levels between the men and women who participated
in the survey. Independent t-tests found the women to have a mean education
score 1.15 points lower than that of the men (p = 0.01).
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Table 5.14. Gender Comparisons
Uncertainty

Difference Between
Female and Male
Means

Protection

Concern

Persuasion

Dif.

Sig.

Dif.

Sig.

Dif.

Sig.

Dif.

Sig.

-4.40*

.05

.99

.28

6.58

.01

8.07

.04

*Negative sign indicates that female mean score is lower than male mean score

No significant differences were found in the attitudes of those living in
the SFHA and those living in the 500 year floodplain. These categories were
combined and then tested against the attitudes of non-floodplain dwellers. No
significant differences were observed in either uncertainty or persuasion
variables. This may, in part, be due to the rather common attitude of those
living near the river that flooding is part of river life. As one man said, “It’s only
water”. Is this an example of dis sonant perception, or an understanding and
acceptance of the uncertainty of the chosen location? Many of those in the
floodplain who have insurance feel they have done what they can to protect
themselves and do not need to worry about personal loss. This might also
partially explain the split between personal and community concern scores.

Attitude and Behavior in the Floodplain

While the participation and support of the entire community are
necessary to enact mitigation, one of the goals of flood polic y is to encourage
mitigative behavior in those living in the floodplain. In order to adjust methods
of communication and look for areas of possible improvement in policy, it is
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necessary to look at situational factors that might be correlated with desired
action as well as attitude.
Twenty-six of the forty-five people interviewed lived in either the 100
year or 500 year floodplain (see Table 4.6). Those in the 100 year are
considered more at risk and policy targets their behavior more specifically
than those living in the 500 year floodplain. I used cross tabulations to look at
potential differences in the purchase of insurance and other pro -active
behaviors (see Table 4.5) between the two populations. No significant
differences were found in the likelihood of either group purchasing insurance.
Those in the 500 year floodplain were shown to be significantly more likely (p
= 0.04) to take other precautionary actions. However, it should be noted that
many cited settling outside the 100 year flood plain as a precautionary action.
Since there was no apparent difference in the purchasing of insurance
between the two designated floodplains, broader associations were sought.
Only 11 of the 26 claimed to have insurance. Pearson’s product moment was
used to test the correlation between insurance and education, income, age,
flood experience, and the number of years in Wimberley. It was expected to
be positive in each case. Coefficients and significance for each variable are
found in Table 5.15. No correlations were found between these situational
factors and protective behaviors other than the purchase of insurance. Nor
was any correlation apparent between experience (frequency or damage) and
the purchase of insurance. All results in this section are based on a fairly
small sample, however, and may not reflect relationships extant in the
population.
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Table 5.15. Situational Factors and Insurance Purchase in the Floodplain
Insurance Purchase
Corr.

Sig.

Age

.79

.00

Income

.54

.01

Education

.59

.00

Years in Wimberley

.43

.03

As predicted, all four situational factors were found to be positively
correlated with floodplain residents’ purchase of insurance. All were significant
at the 0.05 level. The correlation between age and insurance was particularly
strong, perhaps pointing to the influences of life experiences not quantified in
the variables used in this project. Age had additional positive correlations to
education (0.57, p = .00) and income (0.37, p = .05). Education and income
were also positively correlated (0.36, p = .06), though not significantly so at
the .05 level. In the floodplain cases, the number of years spent in Wimberley
was not associated with any other variable. However, when all cases were
used, length of residence had a significant correlation to damage (.28, p =
.03). In light of this, the number of years in Wimberley might be viewed as
another measure of experience. The relationship of age, income, education,
and insurance might point to the importance of a perceived ability to pay for
insurance, while the years spent in Wimberley might instill in people a
perceived need to pay in order to prevent loss.
What kind of relationships do expressed attitudes have with mitigative
behavior in the floodplain? In order to explore this question, overall
uncertainty, protection, and concern variables were set against the purchase
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of insurance as well as other protective behavior. Pearson’s product moment
was used to test the correlations. Results are included in Table 5.16.
Significant correlations of situational factors followed the patterns of the full
data set outlined in Table 5.13.

Table 5.16. Floodplain Attitude and Behavior
Purchase of Insurance

Other Mitigative Behavior

Corr.

Sig.

Corr.

Sig.

Uncertainty

.02

.47

.36

.03

Concern

-.41

.04

-.06

.39

Protection

.20

.19

-.40

.03

Three relationships were found to be significant. Two were negative
and moderately strong. The hypothesized relationship between insurance and
concern mentioned in the above section is borne out quantitatively here.
Respondents already had or did not have insurance when asked about
concern. Any explanation of correlation must reflect that temporal aspect.
While tempting, it does not make sense to hypothesize that, because people
are concerned, they have insurance. The quantitative correlation may be
coincidental, but many in the floodplain said they were not concerned about
loss because they had insurance. In fact, when compared using an
independent t-test, the mean concern score of those with insurance was 8.4
points lower than those without (p = .04). This relationship may prove to be a
hurdle to those in the community attempting to implement additional mitigation
measures. A similar phenomenon might also be at work in the negative
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correlation between protection and behavior, though no significant difference
was found when tested.
Uncertainty scores had a moderate (0.36) positive correlation to other
mitigative behavior, though no correlation to insurance purchase. Uncertainty
was also positively correlated to both education and income. The behavioral
correlation to uncertainty may indicate individuals with an understanding of
risk, knowledge of protective measurements available (or required), and the
means to implement them.

Summary

Some of the hypotheses put forth in Chapter One regarding the relative
effectiveness of the four descriptive methods were supported by statistical
analysis. Others were discounted. As predicted, the 1 percent method was
found to be significantly more effective in conveying uncertainty than any of
the other three. It was also shown to be the least effective method in
motivating attitudes of protection and concern. The map performed better than
expected in terms of both understanding and persuasion and was significantly
more effective h
t an either of the probabilities at inducing desired levels of
concern. The 100 year flood was also shown to be more effective than
predicted in conveying uncertainty, though this may be due to the mental
adjustment of an experienced community rather than a real understanding of
the term.
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The 26 percent method was comparatively less effective than expected
in conveying uncertainty. More importantly, qualitative and quantitative
analysis pointed to underlying problems in using the 26 percent chance to
describe flood risk. The extreme shift in attitude illustrated by the accuracy
question and the 64 percent confusion rate described in Chapter Four indicate
an inherent weakness in the method. These problems may be due, in part, to
inappropriate coding.
Hypotheses regarding the relationships of situational and cognitive
factors to perception were only partially supported by analysis. As expected,
education and uncertainty scores were positively correlated. Women were
found to have higher concern and persuasion scores than men. Predictions of
positive correlations between age, experience, location and perception were
not borne out in the results. These factors were found to be more closely
related to behavior (see Table 5.13 for correlations to insurance purchase).
An important trend concerning the effectiveness of descriptive methods
was identified through analysis. Uncertainty and persuasion appear to be
irreconcilable in the current methods used to convey flood risk. This split is
evident in the low Cronbach scores of the combined scales, the varied
performance of the 1 percent chance method in different arenas, the lack of
differentiation when overall scores were compared, and the opposite signs of
correlations between education and uncertainty and education and concern.
When tested directly, the negative correlation between uncertainty and certain
persuasion variables is clear and significant. Results for the entire data set
and for the floodplain subset are included in Table 5.17. This disparity is more
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pronounced in the floodplain subset and may be one of the most difficult
hurdles for policy makers and risk communicators to overcome.

Table 5.17. Correlations Between Uncertainty and Persuasion
Protection

Concern

Persuasion

Corr.

Sig.

Corr.

Sig.

Corr.

Sig.

Uncertainty (All)

.11

.24

-.30

.02

-.14

.19

Uncertainty (Floodplain)

-.31

.06

-.43

.01

-.43

.02

The negative relationship between uncertainty and persuasion
variables is only one of the trends identified through analysis. Chapter Five
built on qualitative observation and the results presented in Chapter Four,
statistically examining relationships between descriptive methods of flood risk,
situational factors, perception, and behavior. General trends believed to have
the greatest potential impact on effective communication are laid out in
Chapter Six.
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Chapter Six: Conclusions

Hypotheses

The project’s research hypotheses were addressed in Chapter Five.
Only one of the hypotheses concerning the four methods of description was
validated; the 1 percent chance method was found to be the most effective in
conveying uncertainty and the least effective in motivating attitude. Both the
map and the 100 year method produced better than expected uncertainty
scores. The uncertainty score for the 26 percent method was worse than
expected.
Five situational factors were predicted to have positive relationships
with uncertainty and persuasion variables. Only two exhibited the expected
correlations. Uncertainty scores increased with education levels and women
were found to have higher concern and persuasion scores than men. Age,
experience, and location were found to be related to the purchase of
insurance, but had no significant correlation to uncertainty or persuasion
variables. A more sensitive approach to location and a different evaluation of
experience might alter these results, however.
Hypothesis testing provided a starting point for analysis, but the
descriptive results presented in Chapter Four suggested other directions and
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raised new questions. By examining these possibilities, unexpected patterns
in the data were revealed, producing more meaningful results. These new
directions provided a broader perspective and a deeper understanding of the
data, allowing it to be applied in a wider arena.

Implications for Flood Risk Communication

Four

potentially

important

trends

concerning

the

effective

communication of flood risk and flood policy were identified using quantitative
and qualitative analysis.

§

First, effectiveness judged through understanding and effectiveness
judged by persuasion appear to be at odds using current methods of
description. Unless communication changes, a choice may have to be
made. Persuasion and the ‘engineering model’ will likely prevail. The
results of this project contradict the claim of the NRC (1995, 2000) that
persuasion is dependent upon an understanding of uncertainty. More
contextual research is necessary to clarify the relationship.

§

Second, the description of a flood with a 26 percent chance of
occurring in 30 years induced confusion, vehemence, and dismissal in
the sample group. Further use of this term should be reconsidered in
light of this reaction.
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§

Third, a significant difference was found in effectiveness as persuasion
when related to individuals and the community. While this expressed
difference might be capitalized on, it is more likely to be a hurdle to
community mitigation projects.

§

Lastly, survey participants were more concerned about flood levels
than flood frequency and were more effectively persuaded when
concrete

references

were

used.

These

results

reinforce

recommendations by the NRC (1995, 2000) and Smith (2000) to
include damage estimates and may point the way towards more
effective communication.
Just as this project built on previous research regarding flood risk
communication, the identification of these four trends may provide a base
upon which other research can continue to build. The split between
understanding and persuasion appears to be of particular concern, though it
may be the result of a one size fits all flood policy and subsequent evaluation.
Regardless, the relationship between the two must be better understood if
flood plain management of any scale is to be effective.

Implications for Wimberley

Flood management in Wimberley appears to have focused on
emergency response rather than pre-event planning or education. These
aspects of preparation will become more important as the populations of both
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the village and the valley grow. The collective memory may fade with
proportional experience. Newcomers might not have access to the mental and
physical adjustments employed by the community in the past. A common
context must be created.
One of the biggest potential difficulties facing floodplain managers
focusing on pre-event context will be the apparent distrust of Wimberley
residents. This hurdle may be as specific to Wimberley as the 2002
referendum proposing a dissolution of the village government. However,
Anderson’s (2000) work indicates the problem may be more widespread.
Without trust, risk communication will not be effective.
In developing the Comprehensive Plan of 2002, the local government
mailed surveys to every voter in greater Wimberley. Hays County used an
internet survey in order to incorporate public input into the Hays County
Mitigation Plan (www.co.hays.tx.us). These surveys set a precedent of broad,
multidimensional communication that could potentially build trust. If good,
consistent information is made available, this method could also be used to
build locally effective flood policy. In the meantime, the burden of risk
communication will likely fall to the media and local organizations. Managers
may want to target these public contacts.

Generalization and Future Directions

The results of this project reinforced previous findings. Situational
factors like education and gender were found to be related to perception (see
131

Tables 5.11 and 5.12); other situational factors were indirectly related through
behavior (see Table 5.13). The effects of experience might be seen in the
fairly consistent (and high) uncertainty scores (see Table 5.4). Response
patterns clearly showed the importance of both the media and trust in risk
communication. Results also supported those advocating attaching concrete
references to abstract methods of communication.
Previous research concerning the relationship of understanding and
persuasion was not supported, however. Nor were those touting the 26
percent chance description as an effective method of communicating flood
risk. The sample was small, though, and Wimberley, like all places, is unique.
No sweeping generalizations should be made based on this (or any) study. It
is a supporting player.
While generalization is difficult, future research in communities large
and small, experienced and non-experienced, may help identify components
relevant to effective communication and contextually effective codes. The use
of multivariate analysis adjusted for contextual relationships might assist in
this search. Further research assessing the effectiveness of flood risk
communication could result in new, democratic methods of description and
help close the gap between understanding and persuasion. If effectiveness is
valued over efficiency, loss and s uffering due to flooding might be reduced.
The role of flood policy itself cannot be ignored, however. In this
project, and in general assessments of effectiveness, all individuals and
communities were judged against a single perceptual and behavioral
standard. The questions Murphy (1958) and White (Interview with Reuss,
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1991) raised, and that Smith (2000) and others continue to raise regarding the
effectiveness of a uniform flood policy, are still relevant. In order to truly
assess the effectiveness of flood risk communication, it might also be
necessary to look at the contextual effectiveness of ‘efficient’ flood policy.
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Appendix A: Questionnaire

Efficient and Effective?
The Hundred Year Flood in the Communication and Perception of Flood
Risk

Conducted by Heather Bell
University of South Florida

Faculty Advisor:
Dr. Graham Tobin

Introductory Statement
Hello, my name is Heather Bell. I’m a graduate student at the University of
South Florida and I’m conducting a survey on people’s attitudes toward
flooding. I’d like to ask you some questions about your experience with
flooding and how you feel about the likelihood of future floods. All of your
answers are completely confidential; they will only be used for statistical
purposes. The study is not funded by any company or corporation, and I am
NOT trying to sell you anything. You may stop the interview at any time, but
your participation will not only help me finish my thesis, it might also influence
the way people talk about flooding and flood policy. The survey takes about
25 minutes to complete. Do you have any questions? May I continue?
If you have any questions or would like more information, please contact Dr.
Graham Tobin at the University of South Florida at 813-974-4808. He can
also be reached through e -mail at gtobin@cas.usf.edu.
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Appendix A (Continued)
SURVEY NUMBER:

FZONE:

FIRST I’D LIKE TO ASK YOU SOME GENERAL QUESTIONS ABOUT
YOUR EXPERIENCE WITH FLOODING.

Personal Flood History
YES (1)
NO (0)

1. Have you ever been flooded?

If no, skip to question 4.
2. How many times has your current home been flooded?

3. In your lifetime, how many times has your home or property been
flooded?

4. In your lifetime, has your workplace been flooded? If no, mark 0. How
many times?

5. In your lifetime, how many times has a community you have lived in
experienced flooding?

If all above answers are 0, skip to question 12.

NOW I’D LIKE TO ASK YOU SOME MORE SPECIFIC QUESTIONS
ABOUT DAMAGES AND WHAT YOU DID DURING FLOODING.

Give interviewee damages card
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Appendix A (Continued)
ON THIS CARD IS A LIST OF POSSIBLE DAMAGES DUE TO
FLOODING.

6. What kinds of damages have you personally experienced?
Structural Damage to Residence
Damage to Floor or Wall Coverings
Damage to Furniture
Damage to Appliances
Damage to Keepsakes
Contaminated Drinking Water
Damage to Crops
Disrupted Transportation
Loss of Business
Injury
Death of Family Member or Friend
Other (Please Describe)

YES (1)
NO (0)
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0

7. During a flood, have you ever taken any of the following measures?
Moved Valuables to Higher Elevation
Sandbagged Doorways or Entrances
Evacuated Your Property
Other (Please Describe)
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YES (1)
NO (0)
1
0
1
0
1
0

Appendix A (Continued)
WE’VE TALKED ABOUT YOUR EXPERIENCE WITH FLOODING IN
GENERAL. NOW I’D LIKE TO TALK TO YOU ABOUT A SPECIFIC EVENT.
8. Did you live in Wimberley during the 1998 October flood?
YES (1)
NO (0)

If no, skip to question 12.
9. During the 1998 flood, were you a part of the Emergency Response
Team?
YES (1)
NO (0)

Give interviewee activity card
10. Please indicate which, if any, of the activities listed on the card you
took part in during the 1998 flood.
Sandbagging
Search and Rescue
Distributing Food and Water
Distributing Aid
Donating
Community Clean-Up
Other (Please Describe)

YES (1)
NO (0)
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0

11. To the best of your knowledge, what size was the 1998 flo od?

DK (555)
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Appendix A (Continued)

Begin questions here after skips.
I’D NOW LIKE TO ASK YOU ABOUT ANY MEASURES YOU’VE TAKEN
AGAINST FLOODING IN GENERAL. I’D ALSO LIKE TO ASK ABOUT
YOUR FAMILIARITY WITH FLOOD INFORMATION AND PROGRAMS.

12. In your lifetime, what measures have you personally taken against
flooding?
Raised House Above Flood
Level
Raised Utilities Above Flood
Level
Other (Please describe)

YES (1)
NO (0)
1
0
1
0

13. Do you have flood insurance?
YES (1)
NO (0)

14. Do you curre ntly live in a Special Flood Hazard Area?
YES (1)
NO (0)
DK (555)

15. How familiar are you with the National Flood Insurance Program?
Very Unfamiliar (1)
Somewhat Unfamiliar (2)
Somewhat Familiar (3)
Very Familiar (4)
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Appendix A (Continued)
HERE’S A CARD LISTING SOME POSSIBLE SOURCES OF FLOOD
INFORMATION. PLEASE USE IT TO ANSWER THE NEXT TWO
QUESTIONS.
16. What is your primary source for information about local flooding
characteristics?
TV or Radio
Newspapers
Friends or Family
Local Gov’t
State or National
Gov’t
Other (Please
Describe)

YES (1)
NO (0)
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0

17. What is your primary source for information about flood response
options?
TV or Radio
Newspapers
Friends or Family
Local Gov’t
State or National
Gov’t
Other (Please
Describe)

149

YES (1)
NO (0)
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0

Appendix A (Continued)

Give interviewee card with satisfaction scale.

18. Using this scale, how would you rate your overall satisfaction with
available flood information?
Very Dissatisfied (1)
Somewhat Dissatisfied (2)
Neither Satisfied nor Unsatisfied (3)
Somewhat Satisfied (4)
Very Satisfied (5)

THANK YOU. THE NEXT THREE SETS OF QUESTIONS HAVE TO DO
WITH FLOODS DESCRIBED IN TERMS OF FREQUENCY OR
PROBABILITY. HERE ARE TWO CARDS WITH THE SCALES YOU’LL
USE TO ANSWER THEM. THE FIRST DEALS WITH AGREEMENT. THE
SECOND DEALS WITH CONCERN.

Give interviewee agreement and concern cards.

The One Hundred Year Flood
19. The size of a flood is often described in terms of a time period. For
example, we can describe a flood as being a 50 year flood, 100 year
flood, or a 500 year flood. The following questions have to do with a
100 year flood, like the flood of 1998. Please indicate your level of
agreement with the following statements using the categories listed on
the agreement card.

150

Appendix A (Continued)
A flood of the same
size as the 100 yr flood
could happen one or
more times in any yr
A flood of the same
size as the 100 yr flood
will not happen again
in my lifetime
Scientists can
accurately assess the
size of a 100 year flood
The size of the 100
year flood will change
over time
I should protect myself
against the 100 year
flood
My community should
protect itself against
the 100 year flood

Strongly
Disagree
(1)

Disagree

Agree
(3)

Strongly
Agree
(4)

Don’t
Know
(555)

(2)

1

2

3

4

555

1

2

3

4

555

1

2

3

4

555

1

2

3

4

555

1

2

3

4

555

THE NEXT QUESTION DEALS WITH YOUR CONCERN ABOUT
LOSSES DUE TO FLOODING

20. Please indicate the level to which you are concerned about each of the
following using the categories listed on the concern card.
Personal
loss due to
a 100 year
flood
Community
loss due to
a100 year
flood

Very
Unconc
(1)

Somewhat
Unconc
(2)

Slightly
Unconc
(3)

Slightly
Conc
(4)

1

2

3

4

Somewhat Very
Conc.
Conc
(5)
(6)

5

6

THE NEXT SET OF QUESTIONS IS SIMILAR TO THE LAST. THE SIZE
OF A FLOOD CAN ALSO BE DESCRIBED IN TERMS OF ITS
PROBABILITY. THIS SET OF QUESTIONS CONCERNS A FLOOD
WITH A 1% CHANCE OF OCCURRING IN ANY YEAR. YOU WILL USE
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THE SAME SCALES AS YOU DID FOR THE LAST SET OF
QUESTIONS.
Appendix A (Continued)

A Flood with a 1% Chance of Occurring in Any Year
21. Please indicate the level to which you agree with each of the following
statements.
A 1% chance flood could
happen one or more
times in any year

Strongly
Disagree
(1)

Disagree

Agree

(2)

1

If our community
experiences a 1%
chance flood this year,
we will be safe from one
next year
Scientists can accurately
assess the size of a flood
with a 1% chance of
occurring in any year
The size of a 1% chance
flood will change over
time
I should protect myself
against a flood with a 1%
chance of occurring in
any year
My community should
protect itself from a 1%
chance flood

(3)

Strongly
Agree
(4)

Don’t
Know
(555)

2

3

4

555

1

2

3

4

555

1

2

3

4

555

1

2

3

4

555

1

2

3

4

555

THE NEXT QUESTION AGAIN DEALS WITH CONCERN ABOUT LOSSES
22. Please indicate the level to which you are concerned about each of the
following.
Personal
loss due to a
1% chance
flood
Community
loss due to a
1% chance
flood

Very
Unconc
(1)

Somewhat
Unconc
(2)

Slightly
Unconc
(3)

Slightly
Conc
(4)

Somewhat
Conc.
(5)

Very
Conc
(6)

1

2

3

4

5

6
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THE NEXT SET OF QUESTIONS WILL USE THE SAME SCALES. THE
QUESTIONS ARE SIMIL AR TO THOSE IN THE LAST SECTIONS. THIS
TIME THE STATEMENTS DEAL WITH A FLOOD THAT HAS A 26%
CHANCE OF OCCURRING IN A 30 YEAR PERIOD

A Flood with a 26% Chance of Occurring in 30 Years
23. Please indicate the level to which you agree with each of the following
statements.
A flood with a 26%
chance of occurring in
30 years could happen
one or more times in
any year
If a 26% chance flood
happens this year, we
will be safe from one
next year
Scientists can
accurately assess the
size of a 26% chance
flood
The size of a flood with
a 26% chance of
occurring in 30 years
will change over time
I should protect myself
against a flood with a
26% chance of
occurring in 30 years
My community should
protect itself against a
26% chance flood

Strongly
Disagree
(1)

Disagree

Agree
(3)

Strongly
Agree
(4)

Don’t
Know
(555)

(2)

1

2

3

4

555

1

2

3

4

555

1

2

3

4

555

1

2

3

4

555

1

2

3

4

555

LIKE THE LAST TWO SECTIONS, THIS SECTION ALSO INCLUDES
QUESTIONS ON LOSSES AND LEVELS OF CONCERN.
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24. Please indicate the level to which you are concerned about each of the
following.
Personal loss
due to a flood
with a 26%
chance of
occurring in 30
years
Community loss
due to a 26%
chance flood

Very
Unconc
(1)

1

Somewhat Slightly
Unconc
Unconc
(2)
(3)

2

Slightly Somewhat Very
Conc
Conc
Conc
(4)
(5)
(6)

3

4

5

6

NEXT WE’RE GOING TO USE A MAP.
Give interviewee flood map
THIS IS A FLOOD HAZARD MAP. I’LL GIVE YOU A CHANCE TO
LOOK AT IT AND THEN ASK YOU A FEW QUESTIONS ABOUT IT
25. The darkly shaded area represents the extent of a flood that flood
policy considers hazardous. Using the categories on the agreement
card, please indicate the level to which you agree with each of the
following statements.
The outlined flood
Strongly
could happen one or
Disagree
more times in any
(1)
year
If a flood of the size
outlined happens this
year, it will not happen
1
next year.
If I live here (show
point outside all
1
shading), I am safe
from flooding.
I should protect
myself against the
1
flood outlined on the
map
My community should
protect itself against
the flood outlined on
1
the map.

Disagree

Agree
(3)

Strongly
Agree
(4)

Don’t
Know
(555)

(2)

2

3

4

555

2

3

4

555

2

3

4

555

2

3

4

555
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THE NEXT QUESTION AGAIN CONCERNS LOSSES
26. Please indicate the level to which you are concerned about each of the
following.
Personal
loss due to
the flood
outlined on
the map
Community
loss due to
the flood
outlined on
the map

Very
Unconc
(1)

Somewhat
Unconc
(2)

Slightly
Unconc
(3)

Slightly
Conc
(4)

Somewhat
Conc
(5)

Very
Conc
(6)

1

2

3

4

5

6

WE’VE TALKED ABOUT FLOODS IN TERMS OF FREQUENCY AND
PROBABILITY. IN THE NEXT SET OF QUESTIONS, WE WILL FOCUS
ON FLOOD LEVELS. WE WILL AGAIN USE THE SCALE OF
CONCERN.

Flood Levels
27. I’m going to read off a list of flood levels relative to your residence.
Please indicate the level of personal concern you would associate with
each level.
Yard or
Outside
Walls
1 to 6
inches
6 inches to
1 foot
1 foot to 3
feet

Very
Unconc
(1)

Somewhat
Unconc
(2)

Slightly
Unconc
(3)

Slightly
Conc
(4)

Somewhat
Conc
(5)

Very
Conc
(6)

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

2

3

4

5

6
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Appendix A (Continued)
THE NEXT QUESTION DEALS WITH YOUR GENERAL CONCERNS
ABOUT FLOODING.

28. What concerns you the most about flooding?
The Level of
Possible
Flooding
The Frequency
of Flooding of
Any Level
A Combination of
Level and
Frequency

YES (1)
NO (0)
1
0
1
0

WE’RE ALMOST DONE. THE LAST QUESTIONS ARE SIMPLY
USED TO GATHER SOME INFORMATION ABOUT THE GROUP OF
PEOPLE BEING INTERVIEWED. AGAIN, ALL THE INFORMATION
IS CONFIDENTIAL

Personal Information

29. Gender
Female
Male

Give interviewee race card
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YES (1)
NO (0)
1
0

Appendix A (Continued)
30. Which of those listed on this card best describes your race or
ethnicity?
African American
Asian
Latino
Native American
White, non
Latino
Other Race
(Please
Describe)

YES (1)
NO (0)
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0

31.How long have you lived at your current address as of August 1 st,
2004?

32.How long have you lived in Wimberley as of August 1 st, 2004?

Give interviewee schooling card
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33.Which of the educational levels listed on this card best describes the
highest level of school or highest degree you have completed?
12th grade or
less
High School
graduate or
equivalent
Some college
Associate
degree
(academic or
occupational)
Bachelor’s
degree
Master’s degree
Professional
school
degree
Doctorate

YES (1)
NO (0)
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0

Give interviewee income card
34.Using this card, please indicate which category best describes your
household income in 2003?
Under $20,000
$20,001 – 35,000
$35,001 – 50,000
$50,001 – 75,000
$75,001 – 100,000
Over $100,000
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YES (1)
NO (0)
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0

Appendix A (Continued)
35.Lastly, what is your age as of your most recent birthday?

THAT COMPLETES THE SURVEY. THANK YOU SO MUCH FOR
PARTICIPATING.

Don’t forget the survey cards.
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Appendix B: Project Impact Hazard Maps

Flood Hazard Map

Map Centerpoint: -98.09538, 29.99150
Map Produced: Sat Oct 23 16:47:09 2004

ESRI/FEMA Project Impact
Hazard Information and Awareness Site
http://www.esri.com/hazards
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Appendix B (Continued)

Flood Hazard Map

Map Centerpoint: -98.07894, 29.99231
Map Produce d: Sat Oct 23 17:01:38 2004

ESRI/FEMA Project Impact
Hazard Information and Awareness Site
http://www.esri.com/hazards
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Appendix B (Continued)

Flood Hazard Map

Map Centerpoint: -98.12596, 29.97809
Map Produced: Sat Oct 23 17:08:01 2004

ESRI/FEMA Project Impact
Hazard Information and Awareness Site
http://www.esri.com/hazards
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